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Abstract 
 
Research to-date on the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS) or ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) 
foreign fighters has mainly covered the movement of these from Western countries to Iraq and 
Syria. A significant, but under-researched, number of foreign fighters from South-Asian 
countries have also travelled to IS-controlled regions. It is estimated that around 1,000 foreign 
fighters from five countries in South-Asia, including China, had departed by 2015.  
Somewhat surprisingly, India, with the second-largest Muslim population in the world (c.172 
million) after Indonesia, has an official count t of just 23 foreign fighters travelling to IS-
controlled regions in Iraq and Syria, to 2017. The Indian foreign fighter contingent appears tiny 
in comparison with the European foreign fighter numbers or those of foreign fighters from 
other nations in the Indian Subcontinent (e.g. Pakistan, Maldives).  
This thesis thus sought to determine if the Indian foreign fighter count is greater than the official 
count, how Indian foreign fighters compared with other foreign fighters in terms of individual 
characteristics, and the threat posed by these to India going forward. It is the first substantive 
analysis of the Indian foreign fighters in IS.  
It was found that the number of Indian foreign fighters, including departures for Afghanistan, 
is 38. Data about these 38 individuals, gleaned from media accounts, court and other official 
documents, were then subject to analysis.  The collected data was categorised according to 
determinants such as age, gender, home location, education, employment, etc.  
Comparison between Indian and European foreign fighters was also conducted to find the 
similarities and differences between them based on these factors. The biggest difference was 
in relation to foreign fighters’ prior criminal convictions. Many European fighters had criminal 
backgrounds, whereas only two of the Indian foreign fighters fit this description. Fourteen of 
the Indians are reportedly dead and just two are returnees, so unlikely to bring about the 
‘Islamic State-Khorasan’ in the Indian Subcontinent by 2020 as called for by IS. This thesis 
nonetheless also explores the threat posed by returned or returning fighters to India. 
 
Note: All interviews conducted for the purposes of this thesis, were confidential; the names of 
interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement between the author and the interviewees. 
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Introduction 
 
India—a land of diverse culture, is popularly known to the Western world for its food and 
spices. A developing nation with one of the strongest economies in the Indian Subcontinent, 
India is the home of 1.32 billion people,1 making it the world's second most populous country 
after China (c.1.38 billion). In the 21st Century, India is a key player in economics, peace, and 
security in the Indian Subcontinent. Sharing its geographical boundaries or International land-
border with seven countries,2 India has always been vulnerable to threats from state and non-
state actors across the border. Having a territorial dispute over Kashmir with its neighbour in 
the West, India has retaliated four times militarily (1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999-Kargil War) 
against Pakistan since its Independence from Britain in 1947.  
The so-called ‘Islamic State’ (hereafter IS) also known as ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’, 
emerged as a new challenge in the Middle East region in 2014 and went on to become a global 
threat over the last three years. The combatant strength of this terrorist organisation is not 
limited to its local fighters but depends also on the mobilisation of foreign nationals in fighting 
roles. In fact, it is probably one of the violent organisation with the largest numbers of foreign 
fighters since the Afghanistan-Soviet Union war in the 1980s.3 According to an estimate by 
former British spy chief, around 27,000-31,000 foreign fighters have travelled to join IS in Iraq 
or Syria.4  
Research to-date on IS’s foreign fighters has mainly covered the movement of these from 
Western countries to their so-called ‘Caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria. A significant, but under-
researched, number of foreign fighters from South-Asian countries have also travelled to IS- 
controlled regions however. It is estimated that around 1,000 foreign fighters from five 
countries in South-Asia, including China, had departed by 2015. Somewhat surprisingly, India, 
                                                          
1 United Nations, "Population Division (2017)-India”, United Nations- Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs. World Population Prospects: the 2017 revision, custom data acquired via website, Available from: 
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/ 
2 India’s shares an International Land Border with 7 countries, namely Afghanistan, China, Bhutan, Nepal, 
Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. 
3 Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in 
the 1980s”, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 26 January 2015, 
Available from: http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-
afghanistan-conflict-1980s/ 
4 Guy Faulconbridge, “Militants in Syria attract 31,000 foreign fighters-ex-UK spy chief”, Reuters, 8 December 
2015, Available from: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crIS-syria-fighters-idUKKBN0TR1K420151208 
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with the second-largest Muslim population in the world (c.172 million)5 after Indonesia (c.261 
million), has an official count to 2017 of just 23 foreign fighters travelling to IS-controlled 
regions in Iraq and Syria. The Indian foreign fighter contingent is thus tiny in comparison with 
the European foreign fighter numbers or those of foreign fighters from other nations in the 
Indian Subcontinent (e.g. Pakistan, Maldives).  
This thesis represents the first substantive analysis of IS’s Indian foreign fighters. It seeks to 
determine if the Indian foreign fighter count is greater than the official count, how Indian 
foreign fighters compared with other foreign fighters in terms of individual characteristics, and 
the threat posed by these to India going forward. The thesis is divided into four chapters, an 
outline of each of which is supplied in the next section.  
 
Outline of Chapters 
Chapter One: Contemporary Jihadi Terrorism in India 
Starting with the brief data of foreign fighters from the Indian Subcontinent, Chapter 
One opens the discussion with the short counts of foreign fighters from India and the factors 
behind these low counts. One possible answer to this could be the marginalisation of Muslim 
community but it leads to another question that why rest of the Muslim population rejects the 
philosophy of Islamic extremism. As the research theme of this thesis is the phenomenon of 
foreign fighters in IS, it is essential to understand the milieu that propagates the terrorism in 
India. The chapter give introduction to the jihadi groups that propagates the Islamic terrorism 
over India since 1990s. To understand it clearly, these groups are elaborated in three categories: 
i) Cross-border outfits, ii) Indigenous or Home-Grown groups, and iii) Transnational terrorist 
organisations. The section provides insights of the background and operations of these jihadi 
groups. Later part of the chapter discusses the emergence of Islamic State’s Khorasan branch 
(IS-K) active in the regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Reportedly, the allegiance and 
mobilisation of few Indians to IS-Khorasan shows the relevance of concern that raise a jihadi 
threat to India. 
                                                          
5Census 2011, “C-1 Population By Religious Community”, Office of the Registrar General & Census 
Commissioner, India. Available from: http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/C-01.html; Pew Research 
Center, “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections (2010-2050)”, Pew Research Center. 2 
April 2015, Available from: http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/muslims/ 
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Chapter Two: The Foreign Fighter Phenomenon: From the Historical to the Contemporary 
Perspective 
After an introductory part of describing jihadism in India, the chapter highlights the 
data or information available in literature and various independent research reports on the 
phenomenon of foreign fighters. It opens the discussion with the brief occurrence of foreign 
fighters’ concept in news-media from 1980s to 2000s. During that period, how terrorist events 
are reported in media and the term ‘insurgents’ or ‘fighters’ used which is now like the 
contemporary phase of foreign fighters. After a short section on the definition of foreign 
fighters, the chapter emphasis on the occurrence of Indian foreign fighters in different conflicts, 
such as Russo-Turk War and the Spanish Civil conflict. The participation of Indian Muslims 
in these conflicts was merely as an aid to the primary actors in the conflicts. Further, the section 
discusses the involvements of foreign fighters in the ‘Mother of all jihads’—the Afghanistan-
Soviet Union war (hereafter Afghan-Soviet war). Moving forward with highlighting the nexus 
between foreign fighters and IS, the chapter provides an analysis of different variables that 
affects the mobilisation of foreign fighters and how India’s sovereignty is vulnerable to IS 
threat. 
 
Chapter Three: Indian Islamic State Fighters 
As a core theme and relevance to the thesis—Chapter three provides statistical data to 
analyse the phenomenon of Indian foreign fighters in IS. It initiates the analyses with counts 
of foreign fighters from India and four European countries—France, Germany, Belgium and 
the United Kingdom and proceeds to the comparative analysis of the data. The data is 
categorising and represents the statistics of 38 Indian foreign fighters travelled between 2014-
2016— in accordance different factors—age, gender, education, employment, region, and 
converts. Later section of the chapter highlights the threat posed by IS and al-Qaeda in Indian 
Subcontinent (AQIS) to the Indian cyberspace. The portion describes the modus operandi that 
these organisations adopts to disseminate their propaganda through social media platforms— 
targeting Indian Muslim audiences. It also gives brief insight of three Indians who allegedly 
convicted for their role in promoting IS ideology via online platforms. At many instances, the 
Indian government officials claimed that Islamic State is not an immediate threat to India, but 
 4 
 
the possibility of allegiance of cross-border terror groups with IS or AQIS may pose a serious 
security concern. Also, looking at the lone-wolf terror attacks in the West, how serious is the 
situation in the Indian context? The forthcoming chapters— chapter four and conclusion, 
addresses the concern of lone-wolf attack by returnee IS fighters and the nexus among IS and 
other jihadi groups, respectively. 
 
Chapter Four: The Threat to India from Returnee Islamic State Fighters 
Moving forward towards the recent phenomenon of lone-wolf attacks, chapter-four 
focuses on the threat pose by the returnee IS fighters. It supports the theory of ‘veteran effect’ 
by Thomas Hegghammer that consider a returnee fighter as a much lethal operative. With 
examples of returnees in the West and the data of Indian foreign fighters, the section compares 
possible threat from ‘indigenous jihadis’ and ‘returnee fighters’. In the mid portion, the chapter 
discusses the impact of terrorism in India and three major conflicts—the Khalistan movement, 
the Kashmir conflict, and the Naxalites-Maoists insurgency, that shaped India’s stand on 
terrorism and its counterterrorism policy. It also highlights the recent developments of Kashmir 
conflict in context to Islamic State’s presence in the Khorasan region or Province and how local 
law enforcement agencies in India at State-level are tackling the online radicalisation through 
their media campaigns. At the end, the chapter briefly covers the focal point of returnee Indian 
foreign fighter and the counterterrorism law applied to them upon their return to India. Also, 
the profiles of two Indian returnee fighters— Areeb Majid and Subahani Haja Moideen, are 
discussed to give an insight of their lives in IS and afterwards— upon their return to India. On 
the basis of the data on Indian foreign fighters—with only two returnees since 2014, the section 
concludes to the low probability of returnee Indian IS fighters. 
 
Conclusion 
The final chapter opens with the summarised content of previous chapters and highlight of the 
threat of IS to India— either via IS inspired lone-wolves or the possibility of ‘fatal’ nexus 
between IS and other jihadi outfits in the Indian Subcontinent. Through the historical lens, the 
chapter refers to the phenomenon of ‘lone-wolf’ in British India and how the recent 
developments in the phenomenon may raise panic alarm for Indian security agencies. As the 
situation of merger between IS and AQIS is blurred, the final section argues over the role of 
 5 
 
Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency—Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI, in support to the 
terror outfits that propagates jihad against India and the nexus among IS and other jihadi groups 
of Indian Subcontinent. Though there is a less probability of direct threat from transnational 
terror outfits like al-Qaeda and IS, but as cross-border terrorism has always troubled India and 
kept its security agencies on toes, the allegiance among transnational and cross-border groups 
would be a serious threat to the national security of India. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
Chapter One 
Contemporary Jihadi Terrorism in India 
 
Introduction 
In a report by Pew Research Centre, India is a home to the second-largest Muslim 
population in the world, followed by Pakistan (167 Million)6 but the total number of foreign 
fighters from India is only twenty-three (23)7, which does not stand in comparison to the flow 
of foreign fighters from other Muslim-dominated nations in Indian Subcontinent such as 
Afghanistan (50)8, Maldives (200)9 and Pakistan (500).10 The small counts of foreign fighters 
from India are not going to make a big impact in nearest future but it surely proposed questions 
regarding the factors responsible for the flow of Indian foreign fighters and the lower count as 
compared to other countries in South-Asia or Indian Subcontinent. The situation also depicts a 
scope of further research for scholars and think-tanks about why the second largest Muslim 
population country in the world has low counts of foreign fighters in IS? What are the pulling 
factors that attract the Indian Muslim youth to join the terrorist organisations like IS? It is 
evident that the mosques, madrasas11 and charitable organisations in Kerala, a Southern State 
in India, are connected with the Saudi Arabia’s conservative ideology that gains strength over 
the years.12  
The sovereignty of India has always been targeted by the jihadist violence since 1990s. 
According to a news report by The Times of India, since 2005, the terror attacks in India has 
claimed more than 700 civilian lives and over 3,200 injured.13  The Constitution of India 
                                                          
6 Pew Research Centre, “Pakistani Views on Religion, Politics and Democracy”, 10 May 2013, Available from: 
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/05/10/pakistani-views-on-religion-and-politics-as-election-nears/ 
7 Note: Official figure of Indian foreign fighters from The Soufan Group (Nov. 2015) and The International 
Centre for Counter-Terrorism-The Hague in 2015.  
8 Note:  Foreign fighters count by The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism-The Hague in 2015. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Note: A term used for Islamic educational institution. 
12 Sunil Raman, “The New Threat to Islam in India: Hardline Wahabis and Salafis are attracting new converts”, 
The Diplomat, 04 February 2016, Available from: http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/the-new-threat-to-islam-in-
india/  
13 Dhananjay Mahapatra, “Since 2005, terror has claimed lives of 707 Indians”, The Times of India, 16 July 
2016, Available from: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Since-2005-terror-has-claimed-lives-of-707-
Indians/articleshow/53234226.cms 
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granted equality and rejects the discrimination based on caste system, ethnicity, religion, or 
gender among its citizens. But being one of the minorities group in India--the Muslim 
community have suffered the suspicion of harbouring loyalty to Pakistan and have been one of 
the victims of communal riots. In 2005, the Government of India appointed ‘Sachar 
Committee’ led by then-Justice Rajinder Sachar, for the preparation of report on social, 
economic and educational status of the Muslim community in India. According to that report, 
the education status of the Muslim community is a matter of serious concern.14 Accordingly, 
Muslim graduates had the highest unemployment rate in comparison to other members of 
minority groups in India.15 The sense of marginalisation among Indian Muslims might have 
created a space for jihadism in India. 
 
Jihadist Groups: A Shadow of Islamic Terrorism over India 
 The security situation in India is vulnerable to the growth of Islamic radicalisation 
among its Muslim youth population. India is on the verge of threat from extreme-ideological 
jihadists. During the violent protest in Kashmir—a region in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, 
the waving of IS’s ‘black flag’ and Pakistan flags are clear indication that Islamic State is trying 
to hold the Indian Muslims from India.  On July 2016, the encounter between militants and the 
Indian security forces that led to the killing of Hizb-ul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani, 
was very much violently protested by the local Kashmiris especially a specific group of youth 
for whom Burhan Wani was an icon in the fight for liberation of Kashmir from India. The 
violent protest led to 53 days of curfew in the Valley of Kashmir and over 80 dead with nearly 
11,000 persons- 7,000 civilians and 4,000 security personnel have been injured during the 
protest. For the Kashmir separatist groups seeking the establishment of independent Kashmir, 
the violent protest in Kashmir was a golden opportunity to provoke the youth against Indian 
security forces; whereas on the other side, this could have been an opportunity for violent jihadi 
groups to recruit the Indian Muslims to wage war against Indian security forces and the State. 
The philosophy of jihadism in India propagated by IS or other extremist-jihadi group is traced 
back to the prophecy of Ghazwa-e-Hind (the battle of India), a statement prophesised by the 
                                                          
14 Sachar Committee Report- Ministry of Minority Affairs, Social, Economic and Educational Status of the 
Muslim Community of India, (Government of India, November 2006), Available from: 
http://minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/sachar_comm.pdf 
15 Stephen Tankel, “Indian Jihadism: The Evolving Threat”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 37(7), 
2014, pp. 567-585, Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2014.913120  
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Prophet Muhammad, that two groups- a group that will rise from India and join the forces and 
the second group led by Jesus, who will be reincarnated in the region of Israel to establish the 
global Islamic rule, will be saved from the fire of hell.16 This prophecy is largely referenced in 
the videos and literature of the Taliban group, al-Qaeda and by the mainstream jihadist groups 
such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad(JeM). 
This section discusses the profiling of terrorist organisations that are directly or indirectly 
responsible for terrorist attacks in India. For this purpose, the list of banned organisations is 
referred from the website of the India’s Ministry of Home Affairs.17 In this list, total 39 terrorist 
organisations are banned, out of which 14 organisations are Islamic jihadi groups. Along with 
these 39 terrorist organisations, the list consists of organisations listed in the ‘Schedule to the 
UN Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism (Implementation of Security Council 
Resolutions) Order 2007.  To meet the purpose of this chapter, the section will only discuss the 
terrorist organisation in relevance to the phenomenon of Indian foreign fighters in IS or other 
terrorist groups. It also discusses the affiliate groups of transnational organisations mainly al-
Qaeda and IS, operating in and outside India. The terrorist organisations are discussed in three 
categories: (1) Cross-Border terrorist groups, (2) Indigenous jihadi groups, and (3) 
Transnational terrorist organisations.  
 
Cross-Border Terrorist Groups 
  Geographically, India shared its land borders with seven countries namely, 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Myanmar, Pakistan and Nepal. Out of these seven 
nations, India opposes the problem of cross-border terrorism from the jihadi groups based in 
and operating from Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK).18 Unlike al-Qaeda or IS, 
the main objective of most of these groups is to liberate the State of Kashmir from India. 
Reportedly, groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Harkat-ul 
Mujahideen (HuM) are common on the Ministry of Home Affairs’ list of ‘banned 
organisations’ and the US Department’s ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisations’ list, are supported 
                                                          
16 Tufail Ahmad, Jihadist Threat to India- The Case for Islamic Reformation By An Indian Muslim (India: 
Infolimmer Media Private Limited, 2016), 87.  
17 “Banned Organisations”, Ministry of Home Affairs- Government of India, Available from: 
http://mha.gov.in/related-links/banned-organizations 
18 Note: Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir or PoK refer to the region along with Line of Control (LoC) of Pakistani-
administered regions of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan regions. 
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by Pakistan’s intelligence agency—Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).19 Some of these groups 
are allied with or support the terrorist groups that fight the Pakistan, even though Pakistan’s 
ISI back these groups.20 Since 1947, India and Pakistan fought four military wars in years of 
1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999; each of these wars were initiated with Pakistan and ended with its 
defeat. As Pakistan could not counter India on conventional methods like use of armed forces, 
the Pakistani strategists have determined to use un-conventional methods which include 
supporting the jihadist groups in the region.21 In India’s list of banned organisations, except IS 
and al-Qaeda no other group is directly involved in the mobilisation of Indian youth as a foreign 
fighter to conflict zones. Therefore, few noted groups that are involved directly in the act of 
terrorism in India, are discussed in this section. Some of the affiliated terrorist groups such as   
Janood-ul-Khalifa-e-Hind, and Ansar-ut Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (AuT)—affiliated to al-
Qaeda, are excluded from the India’s list of banned organisations. During an interview with 
the author, an official at India’s Ministry of Home Affairs has stated that there is no specific 
reason behind exclusion of these groups from the list and he is not a right person to comment 
on it.22   
 
Lashkar-e-Taiba / Pasban-e-Ahle Hadis 
 Lashkar-e-Taiba (hereafter LeT) literally means ‘Army of the Pure’ or ‘Army of the 
Good’, is one of the most active and feared terrorist organisations in South Asia. Commonly 
known as LeT, it is based and operates mainly from Pakistan and headed by its leader—Hafiz 
Muhammad Saeed. LeT was formed in 1990 in the Kunar province of Afghanistan as a military 
wing of the Markaz-ud-Dawah-wal-Irshad (MDI), which was an Islamic missionary and 
charitable organisation in existence since 1986. Following the ideology of Wahhabism, LeT’s 
main objective is to establish the Islamic rule all over India and separation of the state of 
                                                          
19 Jayshree Bajoria and Eben Kaplan, “The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations”, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 04 May 2011, Available from: http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/isi-terrorism-behind-accusations/p11644 
20 Bill Roggio, “Pakistan: Friend or Foe in the Fight Against Terrorism?”, FDD’s Long War Journal, 12 July 
2016, Available from: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/07/pakistan-friend-or-foe-in-the-fight-
against-terrorism.php  
21 Ibid.  
22 Interview with an official of India’s Ministry of Home Affairs by the author, Delhi, India, 27 February 2017. 
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Kashmir from India.23 With its main objective, LeT is the strongest ally of al-Qaeda in South-
Asia region. Since 1993, the organisation has been involved in several protests and hundreds 
of deaths in the communal massacres in the valley of Kashmir. In 1996, a group of LeT 
terrorists killed 16 Hindus at Barshalla, Doda district in Kashmir. The Mumbai terrorist attack 
in November 2008 is one of the major terrorist attacks coordinated and carried out by 10 LeT 
members. In response, Indian paramilitary forces retaliated and killed 9 out of 10 terrorists. 
One terrorist, Ajmal Kasaab was captured alive and presented as a primary evidence of the evil 
deeds of Lashkar-e-Taiba in the Indian court of Law. Due to political pressure from 
International community, Pakistan banned LeT and after few days, it re-surfaced as Jamaat-
ud-Dawa (JuD) and Hafiz Muhammad Saeed as its organisational chief.  
On the surface, Jamaat ud-Dawa displayed social work projects and relief activities to attract 
the funds from domestic and international sources. But internally, JuD was none other than 
LeT, which was doing recruitment and regulates the funds through its 70 district offices in 
Pakistan. According to official records of chief administrator of Muridke Markaz (Punjab 
Province), in 2013-2014, JuD was given a grant-in-aid of 3.73 crores (37.3 million) of Pakistani 
rupees. In the year 2014-2015, the grant increased to 3.81 crores (38.1 million) of Pakistani 
rupees.24 This depicts the internal support of Pakistan government to JuD, a ‘front-face’ 
organisation of LeT. Due to its uncompromised spirit of jihad and separation of the state of 
Kashmir from India, LeT is one of the favourites of Pakistan’s ISI agency. 
 
Indians in Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 
In 2013, an assessment on over 900 deceased LeT fighters was done by Combating 
Terrorism Center, West Point.25 It provides a basic data about LeT recruits. In the list, few 
terrorists were nationals of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (PoK), 
but large number of terrorists were Pakistanis. In reference to India, four Indian nationals from 
                                                          
23 Shanthie Mariet D’Souza and Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir: actors, agendas and 
expanding benchmarks”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 27(4), 19 June 2016, Available from: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592318.2016.1189485  
24 Shanthie Mariet D’Souza and Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir: actors, agendas and 
expanding benchmarks”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 27(4), 19 June 2016, Available from: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592318.2016.1189485  
25 Anirban Ghosh, Arif Jamal, Christine Fair, Don Rassler, and Nadia Shoeb, “The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: 
Recruitment, Training, Deployment and Death”, Combating Terrorism Center, 04 April 2013, Available from: 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-fighters-of-lashkar-e-taiba-recruitment-training-deployment-and-death    
 11 
 
Jammu and Kashmir, namely- Abu Shuaib Saani, Abu Shuaib Kashmiri Muhammad Tariq, 
Abu Saifullah Wazir Ahmed, all three from Baramulla region, and Abu Asim from Srinagar, 
were members of the organisation.26  
 
Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) / Tahrik-e-Furqan 
 Jaish-e-Muhammad/Tehrik-e-Furqan or ‘Army of Muhammad’ is another active 
terrorist group in Kashmir. Likewise, LeT, JeM’s primary objective is the separation of 
Kashmir from Indian control and to attain this objective, JeM has executed several terrorist 
attacks on Indian soil, mainly targeting the Indian armed forces in the Indian part of Jammu 
and Kashmir. Ideologically, Jaish-e-Muhammad is a Deobandi27 terrorist organisation which 
was created by Pakistan’s ISI Directorate.28 It is believed that Jaish-e-Muhammad has close 
ties with several regional terrorist groups mainly, Deobandi Afghan Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and al-Qaeda. The founder and leader of Jaish-e-
Muhammad, Maulana Masood Azhar, was one of the three terrorists released by the Indian 
government in exchange for the 176 passengers and 15 crew members of the Indian Airline 
flight 814 in 1999. On 24th December 1999, the Indian Airline flight 814 bound from 
Kathmandu (Nepal) to Delhi (India), was hijacked by the terrorists associated with Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen. The hijacked flight was directed towards Kandahar airport (Afghanistan), where 
Indian officials delivered three terrorists, Maulana Masood Azhar, Mushtaq Ahmad Zargar and 
Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh. All three were escorted by the officials of Pakistan’s ISI agency.  
In 2000, Masood Azhar re-surfaced in Karachi (Pakistan) and announced the formation of 
Jaish-e-Muhammad. In late 2001, Jaish-e-Muhammad split when its core members disagreed 
to stay loyal to the government of Pakistan under then-President General Parvez Musharraf, 
who was aiding American troops to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Despite the 
pressure from its leadership, Maulana Masood Azhar decided to stay loyal to the government 
of Pakistan and reported all the developments to ISI. The notable terrorist attack on Indian 
                                                          
26 Anirban Ghosh, Arif Jamal, Christine Fair, Don Rassler, and Nadia Shoeb, “The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: 
Recruitment, Training, Deployment and Death”, Combating Terrorism Center, 04 April 2013,    
Dataset (in MS-Excel form), Available from: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/LeT-
Fighter-Data-Individual-Level-Final-for-release.xlsx  
27 Note: Deobandi follows conservative Islamic orthodoxy of a Salafist model. 
28 C. Christine Fair, “Bringing back the Dead: Why Pakistan Used the Jaish-e-Mohammad to Attack an Indian 
Airbase”, The World Post, 07 January 2015, Available from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/c-christine-
fair/bringing-back-the-dead-wh_b_8955224.html  
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Parliament in December 2001 was carried out jointly by the terrorists of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 
and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). On 26th January 2014, the day when India celebrates its 
Republic Day, Masood Azhar addressed a large rally in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan via telephone. 
While addressing, he launched a book, ‘Aaina’- means mirror, based on the diary writings of 
Afzal Guru, an Indian held guilty for assisting the terrorist involved in Indian Parliament attack. 
Afzal Guru was hanged to death on 09th February 2013 in the Indian jail.   
The first attack carried out by the JeM was a suicide attack. In 2000, a 17-years-old Kashmiri 
schoolboy and a cadre of Jaish-e-Muhammad, Afaq Ahmad, blew himself in an explosive-
laden car in front of Indian Army headquarters in Srinagar, Kashmir. After few months, another 
notable martyr of Jaish-e-Muhammad, 24-years-old, British national Abdullah Bhai detonated 
a Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) in front of Indian Army headquarters 
in Srinagar, killing over a dozen soldiers.29 Apart from the usually armed conflicts between 
terrorists of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Indian armed forces in the Kashmir Valley, according to 
a claim made by the Indian government, the recent terrorist attack on 02nd January 2016 at 
Pathankot (Indian Punjab) airbase was carried out by the perpetrators belong to Jaish-e-
Muhammad. As an estimate by the Indian armed forces, a group of five armed terrorists 
attacked the Pathankot Airforce Station, which is the important part of the Western Air 
Command of the Indian Air Force. Allegedly, the Pathankot attackers left a handwritten note 
in the car of Superintendent of Police, the note said30 : 
“Jaish-e-Muhammad Zindabad — Tangdhar se le kar Samba Kathua, Rajbagh aur Delhi tak, Afzal Guru 
shaheed kay jaanisar tum ko miltay rahega inshallah A G S 25-12-15” [ Translation: Long live Jaish-e-
Muhammad — From Tangdhar (in Kupwara) to Sambha Kathua (in Jammu), Rajbagh (Srinagar) and Delhi, you 
will keep meeting with Afzal Guru’s loyalists who are ready to lay down their lives for him].” 
Later, United Jihad Council (UJC), a Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (PoK) based militant group 
claimed the responsibility of the Pathankot Airbase attack. The United Jihad Council is a 
corporation of thirteen militant outfits, including Lashkar-e-Taiba. However, Jaish-e-
Muhammad declines the union claimed by United Jihad Council’s Spokesman, Syed Sadaqat 
                                                          
29 Shanthie Mariet D’Souza and Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir: actors, agendas and 
expanding benchmarks”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 27(4), 19 June 2016, Available from: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592318.2016.1189485 
30 Muzamil Jaleel, “Afzal Guru and the Jaish’s jihad project”, The Indian Express, 12 January 2016, Available 
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Hussain.31 The United Jihad Council operates from Muzaffarabad in the Pakistan-Occupied-
Kashmir (PoK) region and Jaish-e-Muhammad joined United Jihad Council in the year 2000 
whereas Lashkar-e-Taiba became its member in 2003.32 
 
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen / Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Pir Panjal Regiment 
 Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) or ‘Party of Mujahideen’ is an Islamist militant wing based 
in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK). The outfit was founded by Muhammad Asan Dar in 
September 1989 and has been actively involved in the dispute of Jammu and Kashmir since 
then.  Reportedly, Hizb-Ul-Mujahideen’s formation was influenced from Pakistan’s famous 
religious-political party Jamaat-e-Islami and supported with training and funding by none 
other than Pakistan’s ISI agency to counter the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)—
an organisation that supports the complete independence of the state of Kashmir.33 The outfit 
was on the edge of a split when several voices from the group including its operational 
commander, Abdul Majeed Dar, thought of more peaceful approaches in the matter of 
Kashmir’s independence from India. In July 2000, four of its leaders and Abdul Dar declared 
a unilateral ceasefire in the valley which was unwelcomed by the organisation’s Pakistan-based 
commander, Sayeed Salahudeen. In the year 2002, Dar was criticised of being an agent of 
India’s external Intelligence agency, Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and was ousted from 
the group along with other four commanders who supported the declaration. In 2003, Abdul 
Majeed Dar was assassinated by unknown militants who opened the fire upon him and his 
mother and sister.34 It is believed that his pro-peace talks were not appreciated by other militant 
groups, but no outfit claimed responsibility for his assassination.  
The formation of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was aimed to counter the Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front (JKLF), which was favouring the complete independence of the Jammu and 
                                                          
31 Peerzada Ashiq, “United Jihad Council claims responsibility for Pathankot attack”, The Hindu, 04 January 
2016, Available from: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/united-jihad-council-claims-responsibility-of-
pathankot-attack/article8064932.ece 
32 Shanthie Mariet D’Souza and Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir: actors, agendas and 
expanding benchmarks”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 27(4), 19 June 2016, Available from: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592318.2016.1189485  
33 “Hizb-Ul-Mujahideen: Mapping Militant Organisations”, Stanford University, 08 August 2012, Available 
from: https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-
bin/groups/view/223?highlight=Hizb+ul+mujahideen  
34 Mukhtar Ahmad, “Abdul Majid Dar shot dead”, Rediff India Abroad News, 23 March 2003, Available from: 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/mar/23jk.htm 
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Kashmir. The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen always stands for the integration of Kashmir into the 
Pakistan and therefore advocates the ‘Islamisation’ of Kashmir. The Hindu population of 
Kashmir was working as a knot that ties the State with India. Therefore, for Islam to be 
preserved and prevail in Jammu and Kashmir, it was necessary to separate the State from India. 
In late 1989 and early 1990, a ‘project’ of ethnic cleansing was initiated against the Hindu 
Pandits, who were descendants of Hindu priests and original inhabitants of the Kashmir valley 
for 5000 years. On 19 January 1990, a Hindu pandit nurse working at the Soura Medical 
College Hospital in Srinagar was raped and later killed by the Pakistan-backed terrorists.35 
Banners were made, declarations were published in the local newspapers and the 
announcements were made from the local mosques asking the Kashmiri Pandits to evacuate 
the valley as soon as earliest. The properties that belong to Pandits were either destroyed or 
taken over by the terrorists and local Muslims. As a result, between February and March 1990, 
from 140,000 to 190,000 Kashmiri Hindu Pandits fled the valley of Kashmir and settled in 
Jammu, Delhi or other parts of India.36 The continuation of a terror campaign by JKLF and 
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen led to killings of local Hindus, Sikhs including high profile Hindu officials 
and prominent personalities of the Jammu and Kashmir.  
In January 2002, then-Pakistan President General Parvez Musharraf passed a declaration that 
only Kashmiri groups but no Pakistani national would wage a jihad under the excuse of 
Kashmir. In his address, Musharraf said that “No organisations will be able to carry out 
terrorism under the pretext of Kashmir…whoever is involved with such acts in the future will 
be dealt with strongly whether they come from inside or outside of the country”.37 This 
statement turned the recruitment strategy of Hizb-Ul-Mujahideen and other terrorist groups in 
the valley and they inclined towards recruiting more Kashmiri youth to increase the presence 
and support among locals of the valley.  
In a recent terrorist encounter, Burhan Muzaffar Wani— a 22-years-old commander of Hizb-
ul-Mujahideen was killed in an operation with Indian armed forces on 08th July 2016. He was 
one of the prominent faces of this outfit on social media and had outreach the youth of South 
                                                          
35 K. P. S. Gill, “The Kashmiri Pandits: An Ethnic Cleansing the World Forgot”, Freedom from Fear: South 
Asia Terrorism Portal, Available from: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/kpsgill/2003/chapter9.htm 
36 Shanthie Mariet D’Souza and Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir: actors, agendas and 
expanding benchmarks”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 27(4), 19 June 2016, Available from: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592318.2016.1189485  
37 “Musharraf declares war on extremism”, BBC News, 12 January 2002, Available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1756965.stm 
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Kashmir. Due to his social media campaign and insurgency operations, Government of India 
announced a bounty of one million Indian Rupees for finding him. In one of his videos, Burhan 
Wani appeals the youth of the Kashmir to join Hizb-ul-Mujahideen for establishing the 
‘Caliphate’ in the region and claimed to have recruited at least 30 youth from South of 
Kashmir.38 Upon killing of Burhan Wani, the leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hafiz Muhammad 
Saeed quoted him as a ‘Martyr’:  
“Burhan Wani was martyred. Lakhs of Kashmiris came to the streets to attend his funeral. Did you see a man 
who was being carried on shoulders by the crowd? Do you know this youth who was leading the procession? Do 
you know who he is? He is 'ameer' of LeT”.39 
The killing of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen militant, Burhan Wani made him a martyr for the youth of 
Kashmir and bring the unrest in some areas of the Kashmir Valley. Police stations and security 
forces are being attacked by mobs whereas stone pelting is reported in the areas as well. Due 
to the unrest, the Amarnath Yatra, a holy Hindu pilgrimage has been suspended and resumed 
later. 
 
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen / Harkat-ul-Ansar / Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami  
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen or Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) means “Islamic Jihadi 
Movement” is an Islamic fundamentalist organisation that follows the ideology of Deobandi 
School of radical Islam. HuJI mainly operating in Pakistan and Bangladesh but had conducted 
militancy in some parts of India. HuJI is born out of the Afghan-Soviet war when it started its 
jihadist activities in Afghanistan alongside Afghani Islamist groups. But after the end of the 
conflict with Soviets in 1989, the outfit placed its focus on Kashmir issue and began to spread 
out with branches in India, Myanmar and Bangladesh. In 1995, HuJI leader Saifullah Akhtar 
involved with Pakistan Army’s Generals Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi and Monstasir Billah, in a 
plan to topple the then-Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto. The plan was to eliminate 
                                                          
38 Toufiq Rashid, “In a new video, J-K militant Burhan Wani asks youth to join him”, The Hindustan Times, 26 
August 2015, Available from: http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/in-new-video-j-k-militant-burhan-wani-
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Available from: http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/hafiz-saeed-says-burhan-wani-funeral-procession-led-by-
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the top ranks of civil and military establishments and replace the sovereignty with the 
Caliphate.40   
In 1990, HuJI played a major role in Kashmir militancy. HuJI was led by Ilyas Kashmiri, 
founder of HuJI and senior al-Qaeda operative in the region. Kashmiri, associated with al-
Qaeda operative Omar Sheikh, was involved in the killing of American journalist Daniel Pearl. 
In February 2000, Kashmiri killed an Indian Army personnel and beheaded him in the northern 
part of Kashmir. To prove his brutality, he photographed himself with the head and circulated 
the photograph among his group and Pakistani media. He began his militant career with 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) but due to growing differences with its leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, 
he left the group and formed HuJI. In June 2011, the operational commander and leader of 
HuJI—Ilyas Kashmiri was killed in the US predator drone strike. 
The terrorist attacks in India perpetrated by HuJI members are few as compare to the other 
militant groups. The 2010 bombings at German Bakery in Pune, the 2011 bombing outside the 
Delhi High Court in Delhi, the 2007 bombing at Mecca Masjid (Mosque) in Hyderabad, are 
few incidents partially claimed by HuJI. In 2005, a suicide bombing was carried out by a 
Bangladeshi national, Mohatasin Bilal at the Andhra Pradesh’s Counter Terrorism Special Task 
Force Police headquarters. Some of the attacks in India, such as 2011 Delhi bombing and 2010 
bombing in Pune was operationally coordinated with the ‘home-grown’ radical Islamist outfit- 
SIMI (Students Islamic Movement of India). Reportedly, prior to these attacks the members of 
SIMI provided shelter and logistics help the terrorists of HuJI-Bangladesh and some of the 
members of SIMI joined Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami- Bangladesh.  
     
Indigenous Jihadi Groups 
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) 
 Originated in 1977, Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)— was an indigenous 
banned Islamist student organisation in India formed as a student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami 
Hind (JIH).41 It was formed at Aligarh district in an Indian state of Uttar Pradesh by 
                                                          
40 Farhan Zahid, “A Profile of Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami (HuJI), Movement of Islamic Holy Warriors”, Foreign 
Analysis No. 3- Centre Francais de Recherche sur le Renseignement, 2014, Available from: 
http://www.cf2r.org/images/stories/foreign_analyzes/fa-3.pdf 
41 ‘Jamaat-e-Islami Hind’ is an Indian branch of Jamaat-e-Islami which was established in 1941. 
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Mohammad Ahmadullah Siddiqui as a founding president of the organisation. At the time of 
its formation, Mohammad A. Siddiqui was a Professor of journalism and public relations at the 
Western Illinois University Macomb, United States.42 The parent organisation of JIH—
Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) was founded by Maulana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi as an Islamist 
revivalist organisation. In 1920s, Mawdudi witnessed the Hindu-Muslim communal riots and 
he was concerned about making Islam the supreme organising principle for the social and 
political life of the Muslim community.43 Influenced by the network of Islamists worldwide, 
the young members of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind were not content and believed that the 
organisation is not fuelling its founder Mawdudi’s vision of establishing the Caliphate.44 In 
1981, SIMI decided to split from its parent organisation, Jamaat-e-Islami Hind over the 
grounds of differences regarding the visit of Yasser Arafat—the leader of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO),  to India and greeted him with black flags in Delhi.45 Young 
activists of SIMI viewed Arafat as a Western puppet, while the top-brass of Jamaat-e-Islami 
Hind considered him as a champion of the Palestinian cause. To continue its image as a hard-
liner Islamist organisation, SIMI sought self-governance and separation from Jamaat-e-Islami 
Hind.  The radical shift in SIMI’s ideology was based on three principles- (i) governing human 
life on the basis of the Holy Quran, (ii) propagation of Islam, and (iii) Jihad for the cause of 
Islam.46 
Since its inception in 1977, SIMI was an active, home-grown Islamic fundamentalist terrorist 
group that works towards the goal of ‘liberating India from the power of Westernisation’ by 
converting its people to Islam either forcefully or with violence, under the Sharia law. After 
the incident of demolition of Babri Masjid in 1992, SIMI’s ideology turned more radical and 
violent. By the year 1996, SIMI coined the issue of Babri Masjid demolition among India’s 
Muslim population and propagated that India’s secular democratic image could not provide 
protection to the Muslim community in India. Regardless of being not-so-popular extremist 
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organisation, SIMI grew rapidly. It published periodicals in different regional languages and 
established its own printing press to propagate its message of ‘Islamic revolution’.47  SIMI 
urged Indian Muslims to walk over the path of Mahmud of Ghazni, an 11thCentury Muslim 
conqueror who invaded India and murdered many Hindus after destroying their temples, a 
place of worship.48 By the year 2000, SIMI turned into a big home-grown jihadi group with 
400 full-time workers and around 20,000 dedicated volunteers. Along with such organisational 
strength, SIMI also had special wings for Madrasa students and children aged between 7-11 
years, namely the Shaheen Force.49 
To seek further growth of the organisation, SIMI’s leaders turned out to Pakistan-based 
extremist and terrorist organisations. These groups and Pakistan’s ISI agency took the 
advantage of communal riots of 1992 and assisted SIMI members to get trained covertly under 
ISI officers with the aim of launching rebellious attacks in India.50  In 2000, the arrest of SIMI 
member and his accomplice—a Chinese Muslim from Xinjiang in China, at the border between 
West Bengal and Bangladesh have revealed the connection between SIMI and an Islamic group 
in Western China struggling for the independence.51  In 2001, after the 11 September attacks 
in the United States, SIMI praised the act of al-Qaeda’s leader Osama bin Laden and organised 
demonstrations in the Indian states of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Maharashtra 
and Gujarat. Soon after this, SIMI was declared as a terrorist organisation and proscribed under 
the India’s Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 [UA(P)A]. Following the proscription, 
Safdar Nagori who served as national president of the organisation, got arrested during nation-
wide crackdowns on SIMI’s offices, while other SIMI members went underground. In his 
interview in 2001, Nagori claimed himself as ‘very bitter about being an Indian’ and if threat 
against Muslims continued in democratic India, Muslims ‘will not take it lying down’.52 For 
some beliefs, after the arrests of its main leaders and members, SIMI was dismantled but there 
are some evidences that another home-grown jihadi group, Indian Mujahideen or IM is nothing 
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but a new avatar or manifestation of SIMI. This belief is based on an interrogation of captured 
Indian Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba member Zabiuddin Ansari aka Abu Jundal who was 
giving instructions to the terrorists of November 2008 Mumbai attacks.53 Ansari claimed that 
SIMI was the ‘backbone’ for Islamic jihadi groups in India and had been involved in every 
major terror attack on Indian soil, as the ground support and recce was done by SIMI members 
only.54    
 
Indian Mujahideen (IM) 
Another indigenous jihadi group formed in India, Indian Mujahideen (hereafter IM) has 
not yet officially declared its allegiance to the Islamic State but many of its key members has 
supported the IS’s ideology and joined the outfit. The birth of IM was not a result of any 
political or religious motive and it was not an influence of Islamic religious writings but was 
motivated by the desire to revenge the atrocities and actions, such as Babri Masjid demolition 
in 1992 and Gujarat massacre in 2002, on the Muslim community in India. To understand the 
ideology and various aspects of IM as a terror group, it is important to give a glance at another 
terror group— Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), from where the IM originated. 
SIMI was founded on 25th of April 1977 in Aligarh, a city in northern Indian state of Uttar 
Pradesh. The SIMI was an emerged wing of Jamaat-e-Islami-Hind (JIH), an Islamic 
organisation in India. The rise of early years of IM has been drawn from Sadiq Israr Sheikh. 
Like Riyaz and Iqbal, Sadiq was born in a family that migrated to Mumbai. In 1996, he began 
to attend the meetings of SIMI. In April 2001, Sadiq Sheikh eventually met Asif Re za Khan—
a gangster in Gujarat. Riyaz and Sadiq had known each other from the days of SIMI. Through 
Asif Khan, they came together for the project of IM. After receiving training from LeT in 
Pakistan, Sheikh initialised recruitment cadre in Azamgarh, a city in the State of Uttar Pradesh, 
in 2002. Another member of the group, Atif Amin, was responsible for providing manpower 
for the attacks through his Azamgarh cell. Atif Amin was killed in a shootout by Delhi Police 
in October 2008.  Sadiq Sheikh acted as a link between the Azamgarh cell and the IM’s senior 
leadership in Mumbai. Riyaz’s brother, Iqbal Shahbandri raised the operatives for a specialist 
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computer services cell. Whereas Riyaz and his cell sourced explosives and components for a 
bomb, that were assembled into usable devices. 
According to the dossier compiled by the India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA), the 
Islamic State is believed to be using the banned organisation— Indian Mujahideen (IM) to 
recruit young Muslims from the Indian states, mostly from Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Tamil Nadu and Jammu & Kashmir.55 In June 2010, the Government of India banned the Indian 
Mujahideen and all its affiliations and front organisations under the Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Act 1967. IM group was responsible for terrorist activities in India since the year 
2005, especially the serial bomb blasts in September 2008, at various locations in New Delhi. 
According to a report by the Ministry of Home Affairs, “Indian Mujahideen is a shadow outfit 
of the banned SIMI and Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and is directly controlled by 
Pakistan’s ISI”.56 In the media note on Indian Mujahideen, the US Department of State quoted 
that,  
 
“Indian Mujahideen (IM) maintains close ties with Pakistan-based terrorist groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), 
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Harkat ul-Jihadi-i-Islami (HuJI). IM’s primary goal is to carry out terrorist 
actions against non-Muslims in furtherance of its ultimate objective- Islamic Caliphate across South Asia.”57 
 
In August 2013, the arrest of IM’s leader Yasin Bhatkal and other important operatives revealed 
the role of their outfit in the 2006 Mumbai train bombings and the nature of support from cross-
border terrorist group— LeT and Pakistan’s. ISI58 The split between the top leaders of IM—
Shafi Armar and Bhatkal brothers—Yasin and Riyaz Bhatkal, gave a birth to new terrorist 
outfit, Ansar-ut-Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (AuT) which later pledged allegiance to the Islamic 
State.59 
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Ansar-ut Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (AuT) 
 Ansar-ut Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (hereafter AuT) or “the supporters of monotheism in 
the land of India”, AuT is a first Indian jihadi group which is based around Afghanistan-
Pakistan border area and had pledge allegiance to the IS in 2014. As a separate outfit, this group 
is not listed in India’s banned terrorist organisations. Reportedly, AuT is a splinter organisation 
of IM, headed by its former-member Shafi Armar. Formed in 2012 as a result of  a rift within 
IM, earlier during 2012-2013, the founder of IM decided to send its cadre to  Afghanistan for 
training and fighting in alliance with  al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but some of the IM members 
wanted to go to Syria which led to the split within the IM.60 In 2013, via its media unit, al-
Isabah media, AuT released a video with a title- ‘In the Land of Hind: Usood ul Hind (Lions 
of India)’ which featured six Indians namely, Abu Laees (from Andhra Pradesh), Abu 
Mohammad  and Abu Bashir ( from Uttar Pradesh), Abu Massav  and Abu Sayeed (from 
Karnataka) and Abu Humaira (from Maharashtra). As reported by the National Investigation 
Agency (NIA), the video was issued by Maulana Abdul Rehman al-Nadwi61 al-Hindi, who is 
none other than Mohammad Sultan Armar.62  This is the first time, AuT marked its presence 
and propagated the message to vast community of Indian Muslims to participate in the global 
jihad.63  
The propaganda in the video was very clear and directed towards the Indian Muslims to fly to 
Syria and Afghanistan, mainly to get trained for an insurgency in India. The video portrayed 
AuT’s leader with six other Indians depicting the images of past communal riots in India such 
as 2002 Gujarat riots, 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, and the demolition of Babri Masjid in 1992. 
A message was declared that “Oh Indian Muslims, if you can’t understand, you will perish. 
Since independence from British yoke in 1947, Indian Muslims are living in fear and dread 
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under the Hindus…who worships cows”.64  Till 2014, AuT did not claimed any allegiance to 
any Islamic terrorist organisation but on October 2014, AuT officially pledged allegiance to 
the IS and adapted the its ideology as a part of their campaign through videos and several texts 
via online. Since then AuT is prominently involved in the process of radicalising and recruiting 
the Indian Muslims for Islamic State.65 
 
Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM): The ‘Only Women’ Extremist Organisation 
 As an exceptional outfit, Dukhtaran-e-Millat (hereafter DeM) literally means 
“Daughters of the Nation”, is an all-woman militant group which favours the establishment of 
Sharia law in the valley of Kashmir and separation of the State from India. In other words, 
Dukhtaran-e-Millat is a ‘soft-terrorist’ organisation that uses the threats to impose its policies 
and openly support jihad in the valley but did not engaged in arm violence so far. Established 
in year 1987, the group is led by Ayesha Andrabi, a self-claimed ‘jihadi feminist’. This group 
is one of the active members of All Parties Hurriyat Conference.66 In 2013, ‘Pragaash’ meaning 
the Light of Dawn was the ‘all-girls’ music group from Kashmir, had to disassemble after 
receiving threats online and fatwa issued by the local cleric. DeM’s chief Ayesha Andrabi 
supported the fatwa by saying that it is according to the beliefs of Sharia law and it is better if 
the girls leave their ‘rebellious’ behaviour to avoid any harsh consequences.67 Andrabi is 
hardliner follower of Syed Ali Shah Geelani, an important leader of the Hurriyat Conference 
who denounced IS as an ‘anti-Muslim’.68 In 1990, Ayesha Andrabi got married to Ashiq 
Hussain Faktoo, co-founder of Hizb-ul Mujahideen. After his arrest in 1992, Ayesha involved 
more actively to build the biggest network of ‘jihadi women’ in  Kashmir.69 In an interview 
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with Hindustan Times, Ayesha or Asiya stated that her organisation is fighting for the freedom 
of Kashmir from the oppression of 10 lakh personnel of Indian security forces in the valley, 
she does not know or care about who the Islamic State is.70 On 25 March 2015, Ayesha Andrabi 
hoisted Pakistan’s national flag and sung its  national anthem in the valley of Kashmir. She 
openly claimed it on Times Now— an Indian news channel, that people in large number 
participated and supported this act, referring to the hoisting of Pakistan’s national flag.71 
Ayesha was charged under Section 13 of the India’s Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 
1967. The Indian security forces are yet to confirm any reported terrorist attack conducted by 
DeM, though they suspect that DeM operates as a supportive arm to other jihadi groups in the 
valley.72 During a probe regarding financial support to terrorist activities and unrest in Kashmir 
in 2016, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) told NDTV, around 240 million Indian 
Rupees or 3700 thousand US Dollars had been transferred via 10 different bank accounts to 
fuel the unrest in Kashmir. Much of this money has been routed to the pro-Pakistan separatist 
groups like Jammat-e-Islami and Dhuktaran-e-Millat.73 So far, DeM has not been a direct 
security threat but could prove as fatal weapon of radicalisation and anti-India activities in the 
valley of Kashmir.  
 
Transnational Terrorist Organisations 
 
Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) 
The Indian Subcontinent is a Southern region of Asia. Geographically, it is defined as 
a region situated on Indian Plate,74 ranging from the Himalayas towards the Indian Ocean but 
it usually includes India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives. It was 
September 2014, when al-Qaeda has launched a new regional group— ‘Al-Qaeda in Indian 
Subcontinent or AQIS’. The creation of the group focused on the operations across the South 
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Asia, but the leadership of the outfit was based in Pakistan. The birth of AQIS was a reason 
behind the split between two terrorist groups— al-Qaeda and IS. Both groups were trying 
enough to gain the popularity and loyalty among other jihadist groups across the globe, and 
Islamic State’s declaration of Caliphate in Iraq and Syria seem like a threatening sign for 
replacement of al-Qaeda as a leader of global jihad. Following the formation of AQIS, al-Qaeda 
launched Resurgence— a magazine to promote jihad in Indian Subcontinent. According to a 
statement in Resurgence, the Ameer or Emir of the group— Ayman al-Zawahiri will be the 
leader of the group and under his guidance, several jihadi groups of the region will join in to 
merge into a single organisation, Jammah Qaeda al-Jihad.75 The regional jihadist groups based 
in India—Indian Mujahideen, Pakistan and PoK’s TTP, HuJI, JeM, LeT, are likely to compile 
into AQIS.76  
The formation of AQIS in Indian subcontinent is an effort to deal with regimes of South Asia 
that favours the prevention of Caliphate in the region- the governments of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and the Myanmar. Although there is no recorded terrorist incident directly 
executed by AQIS in India but in a video released by AQIS’s media wing—Al-Sahab on 02 
May 2015, it claimed responsibility for killing four Bangladesh bloggers in Dhaka city of 
Bangladesh and in the same video, AQIS’s chief Asim Umar mentioned through their 
statements, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other members of his Cabinet 
propagates a war against Muslims.77  
 
Islamic State - Khorasan Province (IS-KP) 
 With its thrilling terrorist actions in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State marked itself as 
one of the lethal Islamic terrorists group in the contemporary era of terrorism. In 2006, after 
the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a new group emerged 
with the name ‘Islamic State of Iraq’ or ISI under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. 
After four years of its formation, the leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was killed in US led air-
strikes and his brother Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took charge of the ISI. In March 2011, the 
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outbreaks of civil war in Syria gives the golden opportunity to Islamic State of Iraq for further 
widen its outreach to Syria. In 2013, after announcing the alliance with Jabhat al-Nusra, another 
notable terrorist group affiliated to al-Qaeda in Syria— Islamic State of Iraq declared itself to 
be known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) but later Jabhat al-Nusra rejected this claim 
and appealed to al-Qaeda for their judgement. 
According to the report in Express News, after extending its territory in regions of Iraq and 
Syria, IS has unveiled its radical masterplan to take over most part of the world by the year 
2020.78 The Khorasan regions were part of the plan where the regions from Europe to Africa 
to Indian Subcontinent were shaded in black- the colour of IS’s so-called Caliphate. According 
to the map, Khorasan is a historic name for a region that covers Afghanistan, Pakistan and part 
of India, and other surrounding countries. In South Asia, especially in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, IS has formed its new branch— the Khorasan Province or Wilayah Khorasan. The 
branch is led by former Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander Hafiz Saeed Khan, who 
was the first group commander officially announced by the IS.79 Reportedly, the outfit’s leader 
Hafiz S. Khan was killed in a US airstrike in July 2016. Till now, there is no official 
announcement about the name of new leader of the outfit. In a perspective of IS threat to India, 
the establishment of IS-Khorasan group and the support from Jundallah80— a group based in 
Pakistan, may pose a security concern for India. The arrests of around half-a-dozens of alleged 
IS sympathisers from Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh and very recent, an 
encounter in Lucknow city of Uttar Pradesh in which a self-inspired one member of IS module 
was killed, depicts the nexus among jihadists throughout nation-wide. Since 2014, the 
impressions of IS ideology among handful of Indian Muslims from different states such as 
Telangana, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Jammu and Kashmir, and Gujarat, is illustrative with the mobilisation 
of over 23 Indian Muslims travelled to Iraq and Syria conflict zones. During the Kashmir 
protests over the killing of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani, the violent 
protesters waved the IS and Pakistan flags depicts the presence of dreadful outfit in the hearts 
of few Indian Muslims, if not physical. Allegedly, the missing of 21 people from the Indian 
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state Kerala in June 2016 suspects that these people have travelled to Nangahar province in 
Afghanistan to join the IS-Khorasan outfit. According to a UN report, around 70 foreign 
fighters of IS have come from Iraq and Syria to form the core branch of jihadists in 
Afghanistan.81 Terrorist organisations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) which is supported by 
Pakistan’s ISI, are motivated to send its fighters to Afghanistan to join the IS-Khorasan 
Province. Reportedly, Pakistan’s GHQ Rawalpindi is entirely funding its ‘S-Wing’ of ISI-
Wilayat Khorasan (ISI-WK) in Afghanistan, and several Indians have been mobilised there by 
ISI but later sent back to India to wait for further instructions.82 Till now, India was only 
concern over the ISI- supported cross-border jihadist groups and India’s indigenous  terrorist 
outfits but the presence and progression of IS-Khorasan Province, could pose as a potential 
threat to India’s national security. 
 
 
Foreign Fighters in India: An Exceptional Case of Afghan Mujahideen in the Valley of 
Kashmir 
 As reported in various Indian news-media, small number of Indians travelled and joined 
the extremist groups majorly in the combat zones of Iraq and Syria. In 1993, mainly Afghan 
Mujahideen crossed the Indian border and slipped into the state of Jammu and Kashmir and 
were fighting alongside Kashmiri militants and Muslim separatist groups, targeting the Indian 
armed forces in the region. According to an Indian security official, who was a part of 
intelligence operations in Kashmir at that time, the total number of foreign fighters is about 
400, out of which 200 were Afghans.83 This is one of the rare incidents where foreign fighters 
from one of the neighbouring countries of India joined the civil conflict of Kashmir. Supporting 
the statement, a scholar Alan Kruger stated that the geographical closeness of a neighbouring 
country to the conflict zone attracts the highest number of foreign fighters.84 In his analysis 
report of 311 foreign insurgents captured in Iraq insurgency during April to October 2005, the 
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proximity to Baghdad city was one of the key factors that draw large number foreign fighters 
from Saudi Arabia.85  
In the Kashmir valley, the presence of Afghan Mujahideen meant the toughest challenge for 
the Indian security forces. Based on anonymity, a security expert explained that because most 
of the Afghan Mujahideen were veteran of the Afghan war against Soviet Union, they were 
fully trained in understanding strategies, working knowledge of explosives and capable of 
withstanding the battle for long hours.86  In an interview with Al-Jazeera, conducted in 
Muzaffarabad—the capital of Azad Kashmir (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir), a 38-year-old 
veteran of the Afghan-Soviet war, claimed that the primary objective of his organisation i.e. 
Hizb ul-Mujahideen is to end the Indian military occupation in Kashmir through jihad.87 
Another news report on militancy in Kashmir by The Guardian (London), dated 17 August 
1995 was titled “Foreign Fighters Swell Ranks of Kashmiri Separatists”.88 According to the 
reports, Indian officials reported a surprise rise in the number of foreign fighters in the summer 
of 1995; estimating 1,500 foreign nationals operating in Kashmir. Most of these foreign fighters 
were from Azad Kashmir and Pakistan and the rest from Afghanistan, Sudan, Yemen, and Saudi 
Arabia.89 
 
Conclusion 
In its history, India was ruled by the rulers from different casts and creeds, but in 
twenty-first Century, India is a home of people belong to various religions and creeds and 
World’s second-largest Muslim population after Indonesia. During the Colonial rule, the 
establishment of Islamic law or Sharia law was never a concern but post-independence and the 
event of partition of India and Pakistan as two nations of separate religious identities, followed 
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by the mass-murder of Hindus and Sikhs in newly-created Pakistan and Muslims in India had 
shaped the mind-set of an Indian Muslim with hallucinations of threat for being a minority 
community in a Hindu nation. After Independence, in October 1948, India responds to the first 
infiltration of Pakistan army and tribal fighters in the independent state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
As a result of intervention by the United Nations, the infiltrated area has become a disputed 
land between India and Pakistan with an imaginary boundary as ‘Line of Control’. Since 1990, 
jihad as a tool in Kashmir has been used by feared Pakistan state to boast its national identity 
against India. In last 20 years, several jihadi groups emerged in the region of Pakistan-Occupied 
Kashmir (PoK) and Pakistan, which are sponsored by Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for jihad against India in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
Although, these jihadi groups are banned in India’s list of banned terrorist organisations but 
since their base is either in Pakistan or PoK, it is easier for them to radicalise the Indian Muslim 
youth by propagating the bitter incidents from the past where victimisation of Muslim 
community was very much highlighted.    
As a growing nation at fast-pace, India is not only facing a threat from cross-border terrorist 
organisation but also confronted to the terrorist activities conducted by the domestic Islamic 
jihadi groups. The story of jihadi threat does not conclude here but it continued towards a threat 
from transnational terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and 
Islamic State (IS). Considering the IS’s vision to create the final apocalypse in India as 
mentioned in the Islamic mythological literature, ‘Ghazwa-e-Hind’, Indian security agencies 
shall keep an alert regarding the IS’s future territorial expansion towards India. The presence 
of IS in Afghanistan-Pakistan border area as an image of IS-Khorasan province is an effort to 
access India and its neighbouring countries through Pakistan. Signs of IS have already been 
detected through its graffiti and waving of IS’s flags in PoK and parts of Kashmir, especially 
after the killing of Burhan Wani— a Hizb-ul Mujahideen commander in Kashmir. Surprisingly, 
Southern part of India has also marked the presence of IS’s ideology introduced among Indian 
Muslims. Among 23 Indian Muslims who travelled to Iraq or Syria to join IS, maximum 
number of fighters belongs to Southern states such as Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, 
Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Karnataka. However, most of peace-loving Muslim population 
of India has condemned the IS as a terrorist organisation and its ideology as un-Islamic. In near 
future, India being a progressive nation is a core part of South Asia propaganda of both, al-
Qaeda and IS. These groups’ affiliations in the region have tried to win the hearts and radicalise 
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the minds of Indian Muslim youth and somewhere they succeed to a level. The competition 
between al-Qaeda and IS, having radical Islamic ideology and vision of establishment of the 
Caliphate in South Asia, may result in upsurge of Islamic terrorism in India.     
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Chapter Two 
The Foreign Fighter Phenomenon: From the 
Historical to the Contemporary Perspective 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses and analyses the scholarly literature and independent research 
conducted on the phenomenon of foreign fighters, especially those who travelled to Iraq in 
Syria in the period 2014 – 2016 to join the Islamic State (IS). According to an  assessment in 
December 2015 on the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria, The Soufan Group  
estimated that, around 27,000 to 31,000 people from 86 countries have travelled to Iraq and 
Syria to join  IS and other violent Salafist groups.90 According to TE-SAT report of 2017, more 
than 5,000  fighters in Iraq and Syria, are from member nations of the European Union.91 As 
per the report by The Soufan Group, the ‘official estimates’ suggests around 760 fighters from 
Germany, 1,700 from France, and 470 from Belgium had left to join the IS as of October 
2015.92 These fighters might come back as trained terrorists and pose a potential  threat to the 
national security and this signifies a growing concern for the nations in the European Union. 
On the other side, countries in South Asia are not untouched from the ‘Caliphate project’ of IS. 
The IS’s flimsy dream of establishing a ‘Caliphate’ in South Asia by 202093, mainly in the 
countries in the Indian Subcontinent, is projecting an image to attract Muslim population from 
the region to join their religious-ideological cause also.  
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Understanding the Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters  
  In recent years, the conflicts in Iraq and Syria has led to the widespread use of the term 
‘foreign fighter’ in reports by the think-tank organisations and news stories in the Western 
media.94 In simple words, a ‘foreign fighter’ is someone who leaves or tries to leave the West 
to fight somewhere else.95 Since 1980s, news reports or media mentioned the term ‘foreign 
fighters’ or ‘foreign insurgents’ in reference to various conflicts. The following section 
discusses the term widely used by new media during 1980s to 2000s.  
 
Defining a ‘Foreign Fighter’ 
According to the United Nations Security Council’s resolution 2178 (2014)96, a foreign fighter 
is defined as an: 
“individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the 
perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving terrorist 
training, including in connection with armed conflict, and resolving to address this threat.” 
Thomas Hegghammer defined a ‘foreign fighter’ as an unpaid combatant, physically involved 
in a conflict with no prior links other than religious kinship.97 Another definition of foreign 
fighter is given by Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty—m “foreign fighters are non-indigenous, 
non-territorialised combatant who, motivated by religion, kinship,  and/or ideology rather than 
monetary reward,  enter the combat zone to participate in hostilities.98 The definitional 
complexity in the identity of foreign fighter is a challenge to assess and understand the 
phenomenon. Among various definitions of foreign fighter, a definition proposed by an 
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Azerbaijani intelligence official— Jahangir Arasli seems more acceptable— “A (Islamic) 
foreign fighter is a volunteer combatant actor with no apparent link to the area of the ongoing 
armed conflict, yet bound to it by her/his sense of the perceived Muslim religious duty.”99  For 
example, a Pakistani-Taliban fighter fighting with the Pakistan government forces will be a 
local, whereas Pakistani-Taliban fighter in Afghanistan will be considered as a foreign fighter. 
As another example to understand the definition provided by Jahangir, for the residents of Iraq, 
the American forces in Iraq are more ‘foreigner’ than the jihadi fighters from Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen.100 In other words, the term ‘foreign fighter’ has become a synonym to those 
ideologically or religiously motivated individuals who travelled to distant countries to defend 
their community under distress caused by the occupancy of foreign forces.101 The involvement 
of foreign fighter could affect and possibly change  the momentum of the conflict and further 
enhance the confidence level of the group or organisation to carry out further violent 
operations.  
Foreign fighters in news from 1980s to 1990s 
According to David Malet, the first appearance of term ‘foreign fighter or a foreign 
insurgent’ occurred in March 1988 newspaper edition of The Times (London)102, however the 
very first textual appearance of term ‘foreign fighters’ appeared in the news report of 7 August 
1982 by United Press International, in relation to the evacuation of PLO (Palestine Liberation 
Organisation) fighters from the west Beirut. As reported in news, Salam, a leading figure in the 
diplomatic negotiations said that “among the first to leave will be foreign fighters with the 
PLO, men from number of countries including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Somalia.”103 
On 21 March 1988, the phenomenon of foreign fighter appeared as a headline in The Times 
(London), covering a story on victory of Afghan Mujahideen- “Khost outpost falls to mujahidin 
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led by foreign fighters”.104 It was a victory of Saudi, Egyptian and Pakistani fighters against 
pro-Soviet government forces”.105  
Foreign fighters in news from 1990s to 2000s 
There was subsequent mentioning of ‘foreign fighters’ appeared in several British 
newspapers in context to the involvement of the Croatian separatist forces against the Yugoslav 
government.106 In this conflict, among five-thousand paramilitary strength of HOS (Hrvatske 
Obrambene Snage) or Croatian Defence Forces107 has more than hundred foreign fighters, 
mostly English and Scottish nationals.108 In context to the foreign fighters’ appearance in 
Indian Subcontinent, in their August 1993 edition— The New York Times published a news 
report  on Afghan fighters in context to India, quoting a statement of an Indian security official, 
who was closely associated with intelligence operations in the Indian State of Jammu and 
Kashmir, estimated that “there are about 200 Afghans fighting in Kashmir but we (Indian 
intelligence) believe that the total figure of foreign fighters is about 400”.109 
 
Historical Occurrences of Indian Muslims in Conflicts  
The emergence of foreign fighters from the Indian Subcontinent, particularly Indian 
Muslims is not a new occurrence. In 1858, with the downfall of the Mughal Empire, the entire 
Indian Subcontinent came under the British rule and Muslims in India had lost their long-
lasting political supremacy over other religious communities such as Hindus.110 The kinship of 
Indian Muslims with Ottoman Empire appeared during Russo-Turkish War in 1877-1878, 
where Indian Muslims considered the possible collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a serious 
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threat to the future of Islam. At the breakout of Russo-Turkish war, Indian Muslims provided 
the Ottoman Red Crescent Society with notable financial aid.111 In return to this aid, the 
Ottoman Empire admired the aid campaigns by Muslims in South-Asia with a ‘Letter of 
Appreciation’. In 1920s, during the Colonial period in India, , around 18,000 Indian Muslims 
went to Turkey to wage jihad to defend the Ottoman Empire.112 In the beginning of World War 
I, the Ottoman Empire addressed all Muslims in the Indian Subcontinent  through a ‘Jihad 
Statement’ for a war against Western Colonialism.113 The mobilisation of those Indian Muslims 
was a part of Khilafat Movement (1919-1924)—a political campaign launched by Muslims in 
India to stimulate the British government to protect the Ottoman Caliphate during the aftermath 
of World War I. The Khilafat Movement by South-Asian Muslim community was a notable 
and influential movement for strengthening the Turkish national struggle. Some of the notable 
members of Khilafat Movement were  Aga Khan, Syed Ameer Ali, Abdelbari, Mushir Hosain 
Kidwai and Isfahani, and the associations such as Khuddam al-Kaaba, led the supporters of 
Turks.114  In September 1920, the Khilafat Movement committee decided at the meeting in 
Bombay (now Mumbai) that Indian people should not collaborate with the British government 
in context to Ottoman Caliphate; demonstrations and meetings in other cities of  India declared 
an unarmed war by the Indian Muslims  against the British government.115 Conclusively, Indian 
Muslims tried their best to support the Ottoman Empire through campaigns, demonstrations, 
and diplomatic relations. But, the very possible support from them could not avoid the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire in its struggle against the West. However, Indian Muslims participated 
in Turkish War of Independence as to look after the Caliphate.116 
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Conflict of Large Foreign Fighter Contingent  
In case of modern conflicts, the appearance of foreign fighters in distant conflict zones 
is not a new phenomenon. Historically, the occurrence of foreign fighters was significant in 
two major conflicts- the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) and the Afghan-Soviet war (1979-
1989). These two conflicts had significant numbers of foreign nationals of various countries 
joining these conflicts and subsequently termed as foreign fighters. 
 
The Spanish Civil Conflict (1936-1939) 
In the Spanish Civil War, the foreign volunteers were fighting for both sides— 
Communists fighting against fascism and Catholic fighters against Communism.117 The 1936 
Spanish Civil conflict was a fascist-backed military coup led by General Francisco Franco 
against the socialist-led coalition government of republicans, communists and anarchists.118 
The term ‘foreign fighter’ was non-existent around the conflict period, therefore, the volunteers 
were referred as foreign involvement in the conflict. As being foreign fighters, the citizens of 
the US who joined the communist faction had neither a deep understanding of Marxist theory 
nor a desire to establish a full communist state but, were interested in obtaining social justice 
for poor minorities.119 During the civil war, two main groups were active and favourites of 
foreign fighters: The Popular Front and the International Brigades. Both groups were different 
and had no connection among their fighters except that neither were Spanish.120 The 
nationalists received support and aid from fascist nations: Italy and Nazi Germany, whereas 
the Soviet Union and the International Brigade (composition of volunteers from Europe and 
the United States), were aiding the Republicans in the conflict.121   
The International Brigade was operating under the control of Comintern, an abbreviation for 
Communist International, an association of national communist parties founded in 1919.122 
Several thousand volunteers from all over the world took the call of the Republicans and joined 
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the International Brigade.123 Among the significant numbers of volunteers from most of the 
European countries, the French were the largest foreign group with estimate counts of 
28,000.124  However, there is no confirmed report on actual counts of foreign fighters in the 
International Brigade but approximately, the total number of international volunteers reached 
about 60,000.125 In the Spanish Civil conflict, some of them were fighters and others were 
engaged in supportive services, such as humanitarian aid to the Republicans.  
 
India’s Involvement in the Spanish Civil Conflict 
In British India— the Indians, especially the anti-colonial politicians developed a strong 
interest in the Spanish civil war. Various English language newspapers published about the 
happenings of the Spanish civil war on the daily basis.126 Detailed information about the 
conflict was provided by well-known authors such as George Orwell, H.G. Wells and Mulk 
Raj Anand, who were involved in transnational networks in correspondence with the 
Republicans.127 Among other intellectuals involved in the Spanish civil conflict, Mulk Raj 
Anand was a young author, living in Great Britain and had represented India at the ‘World 
Congress of Writers Against Fascism’ in Madrid in 1935.128 In 1937, Anand travelled to Spain 
and joined the International Brigade but his role was more journalistic than military. Thought 
he joined the International Brigades for three months, he communicated his experiences of 
being with the International Brigades to the Indian socialist and communist network by 
publishing several articles in the Congress Socialist and National Front.129  
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Not only through the writings of Mulk Raj Anand, the Indian public also received the insights 
into the Spanish Civil conflict through the writing of Indian National Congress leader— 
Jawahar Lal Nehru. Other than Mulk Raj Anand, two other Indians joined the International 
Brigades under pseudonyms. Gopal Mukund Huddar joined the British contingent of the 
International Brigades as ‘John Smith’.130 His war and prison experiences were widely covered 
by the Indian press, which celebrated him as ‘the only Indian who fought against Francisco 
Franco’.131 Another British-Indian member of the International Brigades was Dr Madan Mohan 
Lal Atal who joined the British Left-Wing organisation’s- Medical Aid Committee to support 
the Republicans for  10 months while working in different Spanish hospitals.132 In London, 
another important leader of Indian National Congress, V.K. Krishna Menon appealed to Indian 
nationals living in Britain to come forward to aid Republican Spain. The Spain-India 
Committee also organised cultural events to raise funds. Indira Nehru133, who was studying at 
the University of Oxford, often helped in organising these events and even spoke at some of 
them.134 In 1939, the Spanish Republic lost the conflict and General Francisco Franco 
established a dictatorship, with Madrid as his capital. About ideology, the historical reference 
of foreign fighters in the Spanish Civil war is not different from the contemporary situation of 
foreign fighters participating in the Islamic extremist organisations in the conflicts in Iraq and 
Syria. The conflicts in Iraq and Syria are more focused on the establishment of a ‘Caliphate’ 
and motivated by religious fundamentalism, whereas the foreigners in the Spanish Civil 
conflict were inspired by the ideologies of communism, anarchism, and socialism but the locals 
in the Spanish Civil War were inspired by religion.  
 
The Afghanistan-Soviet Union Conflict (1979-1989) 
The mobilisation of foreign fighters in a conflict empowers the transnational terrorist 
groups such as al-Qaeda, as the volunteer participation is the foremost indication of an 
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individual’s wish to get involved in extreme violence.135 The conflict between the Soviet Union 
or USSR forces and the Afghan mujahideen is popularly known as the ‘Afghan-Soviet war’. 
During 1980s, as many as 35,000 mujahids or foreign fighters—in today’s terminology, 
participated in the “Mother of all jihads”.136 During 1980-1992, an estimate of 5,000-20,000 
foreign fighters had joined the Mujahideen cadre in the conflict. By confirmed nationalities, 
these foreign fighters were from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines, 
United States and the Europe.137 The Sunni jihadist vision in the Afghan-Soviet war was 
focused on the struggle to liberate Afghanistan through force of arms. In the Afghan-Soviet 
conflict, the call for volunteer ‘mujahid’ was made on theological grounds.138 Primarily, the 
participation of foreign fighters including Arabs, in the ‘Afghan jihad’ was not significant 
because their counts were extremely small in comparison to the local Afghan fighters. An 
estimate of 20,000139 foreign fighters, mostly Arabs in Afghanistan, were mainly engaged in 
humanitarian efforts. Most of these fighters had served in supportive roles in humanitarian 
organisations, media offices, and hospitals.140 Their humanitarian efforts were supported by 
Arab and other Muslim nations, such as the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan.   
The ‘high-tide’ of foreign fighters began to flow with the significant change in the concept of 
transnational jihad under the leadership of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam—a Palestinian by 
nationality and the founder of the ‘Office of Services of the Holy Warriors’ in Afghanistan. 
Being frustrated with the low number of foreign fighters, Azzam issued a fatwa declaring that 
the struggle in Afghanistan was a ‘holy jihad’ and fighting in this struggle was a ‘holy duty’ 
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for all Muslims.141 This fatwa left the impression on the conscious of young extreme Islamists 
who decided to join the conflict and do their part to protect the Umma, the Muslim community. 
Abdullah Azzam acquired the status of being the spiritual father of jihad.142 The call for jihad 
further incensed the prospective fighters to travel Afghanistan and protect their Muslim 
brothers. This mobilisation gave birth to a new concept of Islamist foreign fighter that did not 
exist before the 1980s.143 After the end of the Afghan-Soviet war, the Afghan civil war began 
but instead of evolving into a new conflict, some of the foreign fighters started to leave 
Afghanistan to return to their respective countries. In addition to the battlefield experience, the 
foreign fighters also gained the skills and network that would have a great impact on spreading 
the radical Islamic ideology and further assisted in setting up new terrorist organisations, 
committed terrorist attacks and fought abroad in the different conflict zone.144 These fighters 
were influenced by radical Islamic ideology to protect the Muslim ummah (community) around 
the world. Post-conflict, not all foreign fighters returned to their respective countries, but some 
settled there only to continue an average life.145 Reportedly in 1993, some Afghan Mujahideen 
aided by Pakistan’s ISI slipped into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir to fight alongside 
Kashmiri militants and separatist groups against the Indian Armed Forces. According to an 
Indian security official, who was a part of intelligence operations in Kashmir, the total number 
of foreign fighters in Kashmir was about 400, out of which 200 were Afghans.146 During the 
Afghan-Soviet conflict, there was no reported involvement of Indians as foreign fighters in 
Afghanistan but post-2008, some members of proscribed terror group—Indian Mujahideen 
(IM), had travel to Afghanistan for unknown reasons. It is suspected that these members may 
have involved in training with other terrorist groups and later joined IS in Iraq or Syria.   
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Nexus Between Foreign Fighters and Islamic State 
In August 2014, a Finnish fighter of Somali descent appealed to Muslims around the 
world to make hijra147 to the ‘Khilafah’.148 The foreign fighters in IS are also emerging from 
the member countries of European Union (EU). The available information on the number of 
foreign fighters in Islamic State is purely based on the estimation. The estimated numbers of 
foreign fighters among most developed nations of European Union are relatively high. In 
October 2013, the Radio Free Europe published a set of data on the foreign fighters149 in Iraq 
and Syria, from different reliable and unreliable sources.150 According to this database, out of 
19,000 fighters, about 32 percent are originating in Europe (including Turkey).151 In a report 
by the ICCT in 2015, Belgium (470), France (1700), Germany (760), Italy (87) and the United 
Kingdom (760) scored higher numbers of foreign fighters from the European Union.152 
Geographically, the South-Asia region comprises of modern states namely Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The Muslim majority 
population nations in South-Asia are Afghanistan (99.7%)153, Bangladesh (89.1%)154, 
Maldives (98.4%)155 and Pakistan (96.4%).156  Out of these eight countries of the South Asia 
region, the total number of foreign fighters from four countries— Afghanistan (50), India (23), 
Maldives (200) and Pakistan (500) are 773.157 The data on foreign fighters was unavailable for 
Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. The data was likely to non-concrete due to its dependability 
on information from news reports and government sources and it is unclear if the fighters are 
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affiliated to IS or any other jihadi group only in Iraq or Syria. In their book, Islamic State: The 
State of Terror, authors Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger mentioned two situations as in October 
2014, then FBI director James Comey told an estimated “dozen or so” Americans had joined 
IS, whereas in November 2014, anonymously a government official told that more than “100 
” Americans had travel to Syria to fight.158 Such discrepancy in the information is a challenge 
towards reliable data on foreign fighters. According to a study by the Soufan Group, the age of 
a jihadi foreign fighter is between 18 and 29 years old, whereas another research report by the 
ICSR (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation) claims to between 16 and 38 years 
at the time of their mobilisation.159 
 
Factors Affecting the Flow of Foreign Fighters 
This section will examine the various factors responsible for the flow of foreign fighters 
into IS. An analysis of various factors is conducted based on literature mainly focused on 
foreign fighters from the European countries.  In their article on the social analysis of German 
foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, Sean Reynolds and Mohammed Hafez emphasised that 
foreign fighters are more “destabilising, more violent and less susceptible to de-escalation” 
than local insurgents.160 Foreign fighters’ combat experience on foreign soil makes them more 
lethal than  native terrorists. In his study of “Veteran Effect” of Western foreign fighters 
returning to home for attacks, Thomas Hegghammer concluded that although most foreign 
fighters may not return for domestic attacks but on the basis of existing evidences of a “veteran 
effect”, the returnee are more lethal operatives.161 compared to “self-starters” with no training 
abroad, returnee fighters plot deadlier and more sophisticated attacks.162  
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Mario Diani defined social movements as a “network of informal interaction between a 
plurality of individuals, group and/or organisation, engaged in a political and/or cultural 
conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity.”163 In a case study on Belgian foreign 
fighters in IS, Rik Coolsaet describes four factors: (i) Social isolation, (ii) Invasion of Iraq in 
2003, (iii) group dynamics, and (iv) the sense of adventure,164 primarily responsible in foreign 
fighter mobilisation. As one of the four hypotheses on how and why German foreign fighters 
mobilised for the Syrian Civil War, Sean Reynolds claimed that the German foreign fighters 
are primarily immigrants who have not successfully integrated within the German society; 
whereas the probability of native German convert joining the IS in Syria is very low.165 
Contrary to Reynold’s claims, Alex Schmid and Judith Tinnes argue that Muslims who go to 
fight with IS are either second generation children of Muslim immigrants or recent converts to 
Salafist ideology.166 Some experts note similar factors under two main categories- external 
motives and internal motives. External motives include factors related to a weak government, 
poor access to quality education and lack of social-economic liberties, whereas the internal 
motives comprise more of fighter’s personal needs. These motives stem from the personal 
requirements that are fulfilled by joining an organisation and may become more important over 
time.167 In the words of John Horgan, foreign fighters wish for something meaningful in their 
lives, some seek thrill, and some seek redemption.168 The sense of religious rewards such as 
entry into heaven and the much-discussed myth of ‘marrying the 72 virgins’ provokes the 
internal motivation in a jihadi fighter. On the other side, a mix of political sentiments, religious 
belief and personal circumstances are sufficient to explain participation in foreign conflict.169 
In a video released by the media unit of IS, Indian foreign fighters appeared and claimed to 
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take revenge of the political atrocities on Indian Muslims, including Gujarat riots in 2002 and 
demolition on Babri Masjid in 1992.170 The demolition of Babri Masjid in 1992 is somewhere 
linked up to the religious sentiments of the Indian Muslims. Therefore, the role of religion in 
context to the formation of a foreign fighter is unavoidable. The interpretation of Islamic 
references to the apocalypse is a major selling point of IS’s propaganda for foreign fighters, 
who wish to travel to lands where the final battles of the apocalypse will take place.171 
Economic, Political and Social Variables 
Along with analysing the factors that influence an individual to be a foreign fighter, it 
is essential to consider the economic, political and social factors of the origin country. Political 
freedom, civil liberties, economic development, unemployment and inequality are some of 
significant indicators that play a role in the   making of a terrorist—a group or a fighter. . There 
is a misconception that poor economic conditions drive individuals to join terrorist groups. An 
empirical study suggests that terrorism is not a by-product of poorly handled political conflicts 
and economic challenges.172 In his article on ‘root causes of terrorism’, Edward Newman 
suggests that there is a connection between terrorism and social, economic, political and 
demographic conditions.173 The political grievances and adverse social conditions such as—
poverty, social inequality and exclusion, when combined with certain factors, result in the 
emergence of a terrorist activities.174 The Government’s lack of control over the economy does 
provide a plenty space to the transnational terrorist organisations to establish its base of 
operation and gather support. 
 In reality, many foreign fighters in IS come from countries with high economic development, 
low income inequality and highly developed political institutions.175 In an  analysis of 311 
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foreign nationals captured in Iraq from April to October 2005, an American economist Alan B. 
Krueger found that among other factors, GDP (Gross Domestic Product), political and civil 
liberties are important variables in understanding the mobilisation of an individual as a foreign 
fighter.176 Accordingly, the lower civil liberties in the origin country directly impact and 
associated with the greater number of foreign insurgents. As an example, a study depicts that 
the largest numbers of captured insurgents were from the neighbouring country i.e. Saudi 
Arabia, where large Muslim population has low level of political rights and civil liberties and 
geographically closer to Iraq.177  
To explain the relation between the GDP and the flow of foreign fighter, Benmelech and Klor 
illustrates with the example of Finland, which has the largest number of IS foreign fighters in 
relation to the counts of its Muslim population. Finland’s GDP per capita in 2010 was $46, 
205, which makes it one of the wealthiest nation of the world, is also in the top ten countries 
with the most IS fighters in relation to its Muslim population.178 This result suggests that 
inequality and poverty are not the root causes for people joining IS. Considering the data of 
political rights and civil liberties in ratio to Muslim population, the research also suggests that 
most IS foreign fighters originate from established governments.179 In case of India, the regions 
and states such as Jammu & Kashmir and the North-East regions, with the highest rate of 
terrorist activity are more clearly linked with the factors of legacy of Separatism, ethnic 
conflict, communal conflict and high population growth.180Therefore, it is essential for any 
nation to address the factors that results in support for terrorism. 
Anchoring 
 Anchoring means a level of personal time committed to family and work that restricts 
the access of an individual to mobilise and join a social movement.181 In other words, the less 
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anchored individual will be more likely to join a conflict as a foreign fighter. Such individuals 
would not be bound by duties and responsibility towards family or work. Other anchoring 
factors include career, education, marriage or other romantic relationships, and children. The 
more an individual is involved in either anchoring factors, the less likely s/he will mobilise to 
join the conflict. As mentioned earlier, education is also an anchoring factor. The case study of 
87 Italian foreign fighters by Francesco Marone shows that main four fighters- Guiliano 
Delnevo (male), Anas el-Abboubi (male), Maria Giulia Sergio (female), and Meriam Rehaily 
(female) had no profound knowledge of Arabic or Islamic studies and did not have a higher 
education.182 In the Indian subcontinent, Islamic State is targeting educated youth who do not 
belong to the traditional Islamic schools or madrasa.183  
Social Networking 
Social networking is an important factor in foreign fighter mobilisation. The act of 
being personally invited to join a movement or conflict by a friend or a close family member 
who is already involved in the movement is one of the most powerful mobilising factors. Pre-
existing personal networks are fertile ground for radicalisation and mobilisation because such 
networks build further connections with like-minded individuals and provide a space for 
gradual radicalisation over time. A strong personal network also reduces the risk factor where 
the recruiting efforts will be discovered by local authorities.184 David Malet explains the 
working of a jihadist recruitment cell with a case study of Morocco. An Islamist group worked 
as a ‘watcher’ in a local mosque where few people express their anger and hatred about US 
invasion of Iraq and issue of Palestine. The recruiters discuss social justice and the duty to 
intervene call for Muslim brotherhood and protection of the Ummah. People who agree with 
the ideology of recruiters were subjected to background checks and psychological assessments. 
In the final phase, individuals who passed these assessments were assigned a ‘handler’ who 
smuggled them out of the country on false passport or travel documents.185   
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Socialisation or building personal networks is the foremost stage of radicalisation that further 
employed an individual into extremism. The support of local organisations that are already 
established in the origin country can help recruiters to recruit a specific breed of foreign 
fighters. In Western Europe, some of the examples of such organisations are al-Muhajirin in 
Britain, Sharia4Belgium in Belgium, Forsane Alizza in France, and Millatu Ibrahim in 
Germany.186 Often Western governments are concerned with online radicalisation; the 
verifiable examples of purely internet-based radicalisation remain rare.187 With the 
development of technology and availability of social media platform, it is a lot easier to access 
different social media applications (such as Facebook, Twitter) and to share the information 
among jihadi sympathisers around the world. Marc Sageman opposes the theory that the 
Internet plays a significant role in radicalisation and mobilisation of foreign fighters.188  Also, 
Rebasa and Bernard rejects that the Internet as a major factor in radicalising the foreign fighters 
from Europe, that the conversion from radicalisation to fighting as a foreign fighter always 
takes place in a face-to-face social network rather than in cyberspace.189 
 
Anti-Islamic State Foreign Fighters  
Likewise, foreign fighters who pledge allegiance to IS, there is a group of foreign 
fighters who are fighting against IS. In a systematic approach of its own kind, Nathan Patin 
discusses not only the numbers of anti-IS American foreign fighters who joined different 
groups to fight IS in the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq but also their backgrounds and 
motivations. Nathan’s report is based on information collected in July and August 2015. He 
collected the data from news reports, public domains on the Internet, and social media. 
According to the report, the anti-IS American foreign fighters belong to thirty-one states across 
the United States, with 16 from Texas with twice the number,  eight of foreign fighters from 
the state of California.190 According to a research report on 300 anti-IS foreign fighters, among 
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different anti-IS groups in Iraq and Syria, Syrian-Kurdish YPG has 31% and the Iraqi-Kurdish 
Peshmerga have 22% of the foreign fighters who are fighting IS and other Sunni extremist 
groups in the region.191 American have switched among groups, for instance, the Americans 
started with the YPG in Syria and later travelled to Iraq  to fight along with either the Peshmerga 
or Assyrian Christian militias- Dwekh Nawsha and the Nineveh Plains Protection Units 
(NPU).192 According to the dataset, 300 anti-IS fighters belong to 26 countries around the 
world. The largest numbers come from the United States which accounted for 114 (38%) 
following by the United Kingdom (13.7%), Germany (8%), France (6.3%), Sweden (5.7%) and 
Canada (4.7%) of the fighters in the database.193 
On another side, the United Kingdom, Germany and France are also the top three European 
nations to provide foreign fighters to IS. James, a 46-year-old Scottish fighter is one of the 
three western volunteers or anti-IS foreign fighters who joined the Assyrian Christian militia 
group Dwekh Nawsha in Iraq’s northern Nineveh province.194 James served in the British army 
for seven years and fought in Northern Ireland before going into private security. He explains 
his reason for joining the anti-IS group, saying: 
“Daesh195 is growing in Great Britain. Unfortunately, in my country, I cannot do anything, I cannot say 
anything, or I will go to prison. My only other option to do something about it is to come here, where I 
can get the weapon, where I can fight Daesh.”196 
The recruitment campaign of anti-IS foreign fighters entered the world of social media too. The 
Facebook page and the website of ‘The Lions of Rojava’ actively seeks volunteers to join-in 
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and fight against the IS. As explained by the administrator of the ‘Lions of Rojava’ website, 
those interested in applying as anti-IS foreign fighter would be joining the Kurdish forces 
fighting in the Syrian territories.197 
Adding further, the applicants to join the brigade of the ‘Lions of Rojava’ are from various 
sectors; some of them are activists, revolutionaries, specialists like scientists, engineers.198 
Stefan Latisevs, a British who spent several months in International Peshmerga Volunteers199 
group (IPV), told Vocativ over Facebook that after some time most American anti-IS fighters 
turned into ‘rambo’; the Peshmerga, or the YPG does not require ‘Rambo’ but team players. 
However, Europeans with military backgrounds are quite acceptable due to their multi-cultural 
background and different ethics.200 According to a report, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
(IRGC) is recruiting hundreds Shia from Afghanistan to fight alongside Assad’s forces in Syria. 
In return, these Shia fighters are lured by the promises of an Iranian residence permit and a 
monthly salary of US Dollars 500.201 As told by Syed Bilal Hussain Abidi, a senior Shia cleric 
and spokesman of the India-based Shia group, Anjuman-e-Haideri, “the group is looking for 
million volunteers to create a human chain around the holy shrines of Karbala and Najaf, in 
case the IS attacks and destroy these holy shrines.”202 Reportedly, in June 2014, around thirty-
thousand Indian Shia Muslims volunteered to fight against IS in Iraq to protect the Shiite 
shrines. These volunteers ranged from students to professionals such as bankers, doctors, and 
engineers.203 However, the government of India has said that it could not allow Indians to travel 
to Iraq to join anti-IS groups.204 The sectarian conflict between Shi’ites and Sunnis could be an 
interesting point for Indian Shias to fight against the IS, which is a Sunni terror organisation. 
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Is India’s Sovereignty Vulnerable to Islamic State Threat? 
The numbers of IS sympathisers in India have grown recently, from six cases reported 
in 2014 to 75 cases in 2016 shows the IS’ presence in India but not at the scale relative to 
Europe or America.205 The mobilisation of Indian foreign fighters in Islamic State is an 
evidence of its presence but does not confirm IS as an imminent threat to India. Recent report 
by the Brookings Institution-India discusses the data of Indian foreign fighters in IS. According 
to the report, 142 Indian citizens confirmed to be affiliated with IS out of which 42 are abroad, 
including 16 in Afghanistan.206 The report claims to have only 10 IS sympathisers among 142 
Indian citizens reportedly affiliated with IS. Only 10 sympathisers from a nation of 174 million 
Muslims i.e. India, seems an uncertain data in comparison to the counts of Indian foreign 
fighters travelled abroad and arrested in India.  Regarding the Indian foreign fighters killed and 
returnees, the report claims that eleven are confirmed killed whereas two are returnees.207 The 
reported data is very similar with the data collected by the author for this research thesis. Out 
of 38 Indian foreign fighters travelled to IS-controlled regions in Iraq/Syria/Afghanistan, 14 
are reportedly killed and two returned to India. The report by the Brooking Institute also claims 
that these foreign fighters belong to the well-prosperous regions of India, Kerala, Telangana, 
Maharashtra, and Karnataka which is an identical information collected and analysed by the 
author in this research project. The report did not mention anything regarding IS’s online 
propaganda and its other activities on Indian cyberspace.  
In late 2016, a postgraduate student from the University of British Columbia in Canada 
authored first academic work focusing on IS and India. In his postgraduate thesis titled ‘IS 
threat to India: how should India respond?’, author Asim Kumar Arun attempted to examine 
the IS as a threat to India and proposed the policy prescription to counter that threat.208 
Discussing the numbers of Indian foreign fighters, Asim Kumar stated that “less than 30 
Indians as compared to 25,000 foreign fighters are known to have migrated to IS area”.209 In 
his work, the author referred to the Soufan Group’s assessment on foreign fighter regarding the 
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number of foreign fighter from India. The literature discusses briefly about Indians in Syria, 
policies such as social integration, counter-radicalisation, de-radicalisation, etc. About IS’s 
involvement in Indian cyberspace, author only briefly points to the 5-steps of online 
recruitment process explaining how the young recruits are drawn to ‘Facebook’ pages and then 
later meet in-person for further activities. As a limitation, both literatures— the Brookings 
Institute’s report and Arun’s thesis, failed to discuss IS sympathisers’ existence and activities 
of them over Indian cyberspace.  Both authors missed to mention a notable Indian online IS 
sympathiser, Mehdi Masroor Biswas aka @ShamiWitness who ran and became one of the 
‘strong voices’ for IS on twitter. With around 17,000 followers,210 he was involved in 
broadcasting the IS’s propaganda and luring potential recruits for jihad. Along with 
understanding the phenomenon of Indian foreign fighters, there is a need to research and 
analyse the online behaviour of IS’s sympathisers who can remotely radicalise and recruit a 
jihadist. 
 
Conclusion 
The theory of foreign fighters has been appeared over several occasions. Historically, 
the Spanish Civil conflict of 1930s and the Afghan-Soviet war in 1980s are important examples 
where foreign fighters of different nationalities gathered at respective conflict zones and 
participated in a cause. The 15th Century kinship between Indian Muslims and the Ottoman 
Empire came in light during Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), where Indian Muslims felt that 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire would be a serious threat to the existence of Islam. 
Therefore, during 1920s around 18,000 Indian Muslims travelled to Turkey to join jihadi 
movement to save the Ottoman Empire.211 The rise of IS and occupation of some territories in 
Iraq and Syria depicts different picture of conflict which is mainly focused on religious and 
establishment of Islamic state or caliphate in the region. As the human resource is one of the 
strengthen pillar of an existence of any group to operate in full capacity, IS’s religious ideology 
and organisational existence is largely surviving on its strength of foreign terrorist fighters. 
According to an estimate of IS’s foreign fighters involved in conflicts in Iraq and Syria, around 
                                                          
210 “Unmasked: the man behind top Islamic State Twitter account”, Channel 4 News, 11 December 2014, 
Available from: www.channel4.com/news/unmasked-the-man-behind-top-islamic-state-twitter-account-shami-
witness-mehdi 
211 R. Upadhyay, “Jihad in India: Time to Review, Re-Interpret and Understand”, South Asia Analysis Group 
(Paper no. 6172), 22 September 2016, Available from: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2056  
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27,000 to 31,000 people212 travelled to join IS and other extremist groups.  According to the 
same report,213 more than 5,000 people are citizens of various countries of the European Union, 
which reflects growing concern of extremism and radicalisation that needs to be addressed. 
The movement of a foreign fighter is a result of several factors, such as anchoring, social 
networking and different economic and social variables. According to a case study on German 
foreign fighters, the probability of a German native to join IS in Syria is minimal as compare 
to immigrants who are unsuccessful to integrate within German society. To stop the growing 
rate of mobilisation of foreign fighters to the conflict zones like Iraq and Syria, the policy 
makers must understand the factors of isolation of Muslim community within any society and 
minimise the risk factor of radicalisation with the involvement of religious leaders. Different 
anti-IS groups such as ‘Lions of Rojava’, peshmerga and YPG have experienced members 
especially the war-veterans of US or UK armed forces. Out of 300 anti-IS fighters, majority 
belong to United States (38%) and United Kingdom (13.7%). Fighters from same geographical 
locations are divided in two different categories of foreign fighters that are involved in conflict 
in Iraq and Syria. The first category is of radical extremists who believe in violence and 
brutality against humanity to establish the Islamic state and the other category is of fighters 
who are fighting against those radical extremists. Considering IS’s vision of expansion of 
Caliphate by the year 2020 towards the Indian Subcontinent and mobilisation of Indian foreign 
fighters does shows the presence of IS among Indian Muslim youths but as the counts of Indian 
foreign fighters are very small and law-enforcement’s vigilance on the matter. Therefore, it 
would be too early to predict that Islamic State is an immediate threat to India.  Also, we cannot 
underestimate an allegiance of cross-border terrorist groups based in Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
such Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) respectively to the 
transnational terrorist organisations like AQIS and IS that may pose a troublesome situation 
for India; for which Indian government must work towards the development in their 
counterterrorism and foreign fighter policies.   
 
                                                          
212 The Soufan Group, “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria 
and Iraq”, The Soufan Group, December 2015, Available from: http://soufangroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf  
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Chapter Three 
Indian Islamic State Fighters 
 
 
“Indeed, the ummah of Islam is watching your jihad with eyes of hope, and indeed you have brothers in many 
parts of the word being inflicted with the worst kinds of torture. ……. Muslims’ rights are forcibly seized in 
China, India, Palestine…………O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good……by Allah’s 
grace- you have a state and khilafah, which will return your dignity, might, rights and leadership.......It is 
khilafah that gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, Shami, Iraqi…….” – Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.214 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Islamic State’s self-claimed leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has announced his intentions 
not to limit the region of Islamic State to Iraq and Syria but to expand it further towards East 
and establish the Islamic State of Khorasan, which includes Afghanistan, the Central Asian 
Republic nations, Eastern Iran and Pakistan. According to the report by India Today, IS has 
unveiled its terrifying plan to take control of the Middle East region, North Africa, most of the 
Indian Subcontinent and parts of Europe by the year 2020, to complete its Caliphate. The plan 
is highlighted through a map where the regions from Europe to Africa and the Indian sub-
continent are shaded in black—the colour of IS’ Caliphate.215 
This chapter discusses the emergence of IS’s strategy of ‘Caliphate’ in South Asia region, 
particularly targeting India. It will also discuss the factors responsible for the mobilisation of a 
‘handful’ Indian Muslims to the conflict zones in Iraq or Syria. Along with the profiling of 
Indians who are killed in these conflict zones, it also discusses the profile of two Indians, Areeb 
Majeed and Subahani Haja Moideen, who fought for IS in Iraq and Syria and got arrested by 
                                                          
214 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Message as Caliph”, Middle East Forum, 02 July 
2014, Available from: http://www.meforum.org/4744/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-message-as-caliph  (Emphasis 
added) 
215 PTI, “IS map of areas it wants to take over by 2020 includes India”, India Today, 10 August 2015, Available 
from: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-in-2020-if-IS-plans-succeed/1/457594.html  
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Indian law-enforcement officials upon their arrival to India. In recent times, the rise in foreign 
fighters in IS from different countries has been a core theme of research among different 
scholars and independent research groups like The Soufan Group, ICSR, and ICCT. These 
research groups collected data on foreign fighters from various sources, reliable and non-
reliable, for their assessment on the on-growing issue of foreign fighters. In a statement given 
by India’s Minister of Home Affairs Rajnath Singh, there is negligible support from Indian 
youth for IS and he gave credit to families from Muslim community for discouraging their 
children from getting influenced by the terror group.216 Similarly, according to an official of 
‘Internal Security Division’ at India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, “…the cultural roots and 
family values among Indians are much stronger that it weans away an Indian Muslim youth to 
join such jihadi outfits”.217 But on the flip-side of this narrative, the mobilization of Indian 
foreign fighters to conflict zone raises the question of why these Indians travelled to conflict 
zones even as others from the same community stayed back. As an assumption, IS might not 
be an immediate threat but its ideology and an increase in the count of sympathisers poses a 
concern for the government and intelligence community of India. Recent reports of Indians 
involved in fighting for IS in combat zones of Iraq/Syria have sparked concern over the possible 
presence of IS’s ideology in India with the larger picture of its outreach in the Indian 
subcontinent.     
 
Mobilisation of Indians in Islamic State 
Defining a “foreign fighter” could refer to a violent combatant who willingly leaves its 
country of residence with an intention to get trained or to take up arms against the opposite 
group in a conflict zone. As stated earlier, the main objective of Islamic State is to establish the 
‘so-called’ global Caliphate by carrying out terror activities across different countries in the 
world including India.218 In the case of European Union, foreign fighters from France, 
Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom constitute most of the ‘European foreign fighters’ 
who joined IS.219 According to a  report, France with 1700 fighters, is followed by Germany 
                                                          
216 “No immediate threat to nation from IS, says Rajnath Singh”, India Today, 16 December 2014, Available 
from: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/IS-rajnath-singh-immediate-threat-bangalore-techie-terror-
group/1/407159.html 
217 Interview with an official of India’s Ministry of Home Affairs by the author, Delhi, India, 27 February 2017. 
218 PTI, “IS map of areas it wants to take over by 2020 includes India”, India Today, 10 August 2015, Available 
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219 “Most European IS fighters come from France, Germany, UK- study”, RT News, 01 April 2016, Available 
from: https://www.rt.com/news/338080-europe-IS-foreign-fighters/  
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and UK with 760 and Belgium with 516 foreign fighters from the region.220 Post-radicalisation 
from the radical propaganda, only a few Muslim youth from India have expressed their 
cohesion, allegiance and support to IS and have left India to become a jihadi under the 
supervision of their IS handlers. This section discusses the deployment of Indians in Iraq and 
Syria as a fighter with IS affiliation. It also analyses data collected by different research/think-
tank organisations as well as information gathered by the author from different news reports 
and interviews with subject-matter expertise. According to investigation agencies as many as 
67 Indians have joined IS, but the numbers could be higher.221 To meet the primary and 
essential requirements of this paper, the analysis is based on collective information of 38 
Indians, who travelled to IS-controlled regions in Iraq and Syria.   The counts of Indian foreign 
fighters collected by the author are very near to the numbers mentioned in news-media reports. 
According to a report by an Indian security agency, around 75 Indians have so far joined IS, 
out of these 45 travelled from India, while remaining were the Indian Diaspora.222 It is essential 
to study the mobilisation of foreign fighters as they are more violent and less open to de-
escalation in comparison to local terrorists.223 It is difficult to give a single answer to the 
question—What motivates these individuals to join terrorist organisations, in spite of being 
educated, with strong cultural values and decent employment in their home country? In 2010, 
a special report on foreign fighters by the United States Institute of Peace depicts the case 
studies of 2,032 individuals who were trying to channelize their frustration through revenge, 
achieve social status in the form of recognition, or experience a sense of thrill by joining al-
Qaeda.224 Regardless of the motives of these foreign fighters, they pose a serious security threat 
both at home and abroad.  
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Pohl, Alastair Reed and Sofia Zavagli, “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union- Profiles, 
Threats & Policies”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism- The Hague, April 2016, Available from: 
https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-
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Factor-Wise Classification of Data of Indian Foreign Fighters 
 
 In 2015, the government of India updated the list of ‘proscribed terrorist organisations’ 
which includes the native and transnational terrorist organisations. As on 30 March 2015, IS—
named as ‘Islamic State/Islamic State of Iraq and Levant/Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Daish, 
and all its manifestations’ was declared as banned terrorist organisation under Section 35 of 
India’s Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.225 In a news report, the National 
Investigation Agency  revealed that in 2015 only two cases were registered  related to IS 
whereas in 2016, the numbers increased to 12 .226 This highlights the presence of IS propaganda 
among Indians. For analysis, the collective data on Indian foreign fighters is divided among 
different groups, such as age, gender, education, employment, region and converts. As 
mentioned earlier, it is difficult to provide an actual analysis as much of the verified data is   
with the Indian intelligence agencies and difficult to access for academic purposes.   
 
Age  
This section analyses the data of Indian foreign fighters by classifying them into 
different age groups. The data is collected from two main categories: (i) Indians who left India 
to join IS and, (ii) Indians arrested in nation-wide raids and while moving out of India with 
intentions to travel to IS-controlled conflict  regions, mainly in Iraq and Syria. As much of the 
data is collected from various news and media sources, there are limitations to acquiring the 
‘actual age’ and the possibility of getting ‘no age’ of an individual foreign fighter remains.  
                                                          
225 Ministry of Home Affairs: Government of India, List of Banned Terrorist Organisations under section 35 of 
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Figure 1: Age-wise classification of Indian Foreign Fighters 
 
Figure 1 shows the age-wise classification of Indian foreign fighters who travelled to 
IS-controlled areas and individuals arrested, suspected to be affiliated with IS. In both 
categories—travelled and arrested, majority of Indian foreign fighters belong to the age group 
of 20-25 years and 26-30 years, 14 and 11 respectively. According to a report by The Soufan 
Group, the usual age group of the individuals known to have travelled to join IS as foreign 
fighters is 18-29 years; some of them are in their 30s.227 The age-wise data of Indian foreign 
fighters nearly matches the foreign fighters’ data from Belgium, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. According to the age-wise study conducted by ICCT, the average age of a Belgian 
foreign fighter is 25.7 years. Many of foreign fighters from Germany and the United Kingdom 
are younger than the age of 30 years.228 The average age of the 38 Indian foreign fighters is 28 
years and almost 66% of them are under the younger or equal to age of 30 years. This age-wise 
data shows the similarity between the European and Indian foreign fighters irrespective of the 
cultural and geographical differences.  
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Referring to India’s Census of population of 2011, around 31% of the population belongs to 
the age group of 18-35 years.229 According to the dataset, Indian foreign fighters below 35-
years are 73.68% of the total count i.e. 38. As depicted through figures, the count of Indian 
foreign fighters who travelled to IS-controlled conflict areas in comparison with the total 
population of India, is an insignificant number. But on considering the percentage of these 
foreign fighters (approx. 74%) in comparison with the percentage of Indian population in the 
age-group of 18-35 years i.e. 31%, these figures are worrisome. In 2016, India’s National 
Investigation Agency (NIA) conducted nation-wide search operations and arrested 52 
individuals suspected to be linked with IS in India. NIA revealed that out of these 52— 28  
belonged to the age group of 18-25 years, 20 belonged to the age group of 25-40 years and the 
remaining four  to the age group above 40 years.230  There are no media or government reports 
on “older” Indian foreign fighters over 40 years, who travelled to IS-controlled regions. 
Conclusively, the study shows that based on an age-wise data analysis, the case of the Indian 
foreign fighters is no different but instead equals to the cases of European foreign fighters.    
 
Gender 
The phenomenon of the foreign fighter is a male phenomenon,231 maybe this is the 
reason behind few examples of women as foreign fighters in conflict zones. Perhaps the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) is one of the major conflicts where women served mainly as 
nurses but also many women were involved as combatants on equal terms with men.232 In June 
2014, IS’s declaration of the Caliphate and call for ‘foreign fighters’ received a positive 
response from citizens of Western countries, mainly Europe and North America. The majority 
of these travellers are men but there is a rise in the number of women, with an estimated figure 
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of 550 who left their homes and travelled to Iraq and Syria to join IS.233 In 2015, an article in 
Dissent magazine stated that the number of women foreign fighters from European countries, 
North America and Australia, amount to around ten percent of the total number of foreign 
fighters in Iraq and Syria.234 Whereas in 2014, The Soufan Group claims that the number of 
women from Europe is 18  percent of the total number of European foreign fighters.235 Women 
travelling to conflict zones with a purpose to join jihadist extremist groups, is a new aspect in 
the phenomenon of foreign fighters.  
The recent examples of women’s active participation in jihadi activities include the Belgian 
convert Muriel Degauque, American citizen Colleen Renee LaRose popularly known as “Jihadi 
Jane” and the British national Samantha Louise Lewthwaite.236 “Jihadi Jane” was a convert to 
Islam in her 30s, radicalised and actively involved in the recruitment process of other foreign 
fighters.237 Colleen R. La Rose was convicted of plotting the killing of a Swedish artist, Lars 
Vilks for drawing the cartoon of Prophet Muhammad, and was sentenced for federal 
punishment for ten years.238 Islamic State is not the first terrorist organisation to introduce 
women fighters in its group. The women in the Chechen suicide squad also known as the 
“Black Widows” wore explosive belts and were  determined squad members  equipped with a 
stronger will than the men regarding suicide missions.239 Thenmozhi Rajaratnam, a female 
member of a notable South Asian terror group— Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
successfully carried out a suicide mission targeting then-Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
on May 1991.240 In Indian subcontinent, this was the ‘first-of-its-kind’ suicide mission 
executed by “a woman on Indian soil.”  
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Figure 2: Gender-wise classification of Indian Foreign Fighters 
 
According to “gender-wise” data classification of Indian foreign fighters, number of male 
foreign fighters is more than female participants. Among thirty-eight Indian foreign fighters, 
there are six females who travelled with their respective family and children. The ICCT’s report 
on European foreign fighters shows that among men foreign fighters, 9.10% from Belgium, 
11.76% from France, 20% from Germany241 and relatively small but growing number of around 
10% of female fighters are from the United Kingdom.242 Analysing the European women 
fighters, around 15.78% of 38 Indian foreign fighters, are women; which is relatively higher 
than the percentage from Belgium and France. These Indian women travelled with their 
husbands to the IS-controlled region in Afghanistan. According to a report, Finland’s Interior 
Ministry stated that their government is aware of women and children who travelled with male 
foreign fighters to IS.243 As per the research, the motivational factors for European women to 
become jihadi is not different from the men; the oppressions of Muslim community, ideological 
and religious duty towards Islam, is one of their motivations.244  
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The phenomenon of ‘jihadi brides’ refers to the girls and women travelling abroad to join the 
IS. The role of these jihadi brides is often limited to that of wife, with an exception of tasks 
related to Sharia female police and nurses.245 Several news headlines in the Indian press 
mentioned the term ‘jihadi brides’ in a different context. In news, the term ‘Jihadi brides’ either 
referred to the women fighters from the West246 or to a ‘dream’247 sold out in IS propaganda to 
Indian youth. As reported by investigation agency, Indian foreign fighters are outlawed by 
‘Arab fighters’ who get the priority of choosing women as a bride.248 In 2016, several Indian 
news-media reported the ‘missing’ news249 of approximately 17 people from an Indian state of 
Kerala, including five married couple, but the press did not refer to these women as ‘jihadi 
brides’. The Indian news-media only reported the departure of these Indian women along with 
the information of their male partners who travelled as foreign fighters. 
 
Education 
The World Bank report, based on leaked data of IS which was obtained by the German 
intelligence agency, has revealed that all IS recruits (mainly foreign fighters) are well-educated 
and wealthy. This data is based on socio-economic details of 3,803 foreign fighters who joined 
IS between 2013 and 2014.250 Turning to the IS’s foreign fighters’ education data, 69% of 
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fighters had attained at least secondary level education, 15% were school drop-outs and <2% 
were illiterate or had no formal education.251 
 
 
Figure 3: Education-wise classification of Indian foreign fighters who travelled to IS-controlled territory 
 
According to the above data, 38 Indian foreign fighters who travelled to IS-controlled 
territories in Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan, have attained basic secondary level education, 
excluding the numbers with ‘no information’. Only two individuals attained the Islamic 
education from religious institution or madrasas. If literacy rate among different states of India 
is considered as one of the basic factors to understand the connection between education and 
the counts of foreign fighters from their respective states, the results are quite surprising.  
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Figure 4: Region-wise ‘provisional’ literacy rate in India according to census data 2011 
The above figure shows the literacy rate of eight states where the foreign fighters came from. 
According to India’s Census in 2011,252 among these eight states the state of Kerala scored the 
highest literacy rate of 93.91% followed by the state of Maharashtra whereas the state of 
Andhra Pradesh scored the lowest of 67.66%.  
 
 
Figure 5: State-wise literacy rate (%) in 2011 and correlation between the counts of Indian foreign fighters253 
 
In the context of Indian foreign fighters, the state of Kerala has the highest counts of individuals 
i.e. 17 who travelled to IS-controlled territories in Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan. The two Indian 
states, Kerala and Maharashtra scored top two places in terms of highest literacy rates and the 
highest counts of foreign fighters. The figures show that an increase in the count of Indian 
                                                          
252 Department of Economic Affairs- Ministry of Finance, State-wise Literacy Rates (1951-2001) (Ministry of 
Finance, 13 February 2014), Available from: https://data.gov.in/catalog/state-wise-literacy-rates  
253 Note: The state of Telangana was formed in 2014 and at the time of Census in 2011, it was a part of the state 
of Andhra Pradesh. 
 63 
 
foreign fighters from a state has no relation with the state’s literacy rate or level of education 
system.  According to a news report regarding nation-wide arrests of 52 individuals in 2016, 
the NIA revealed that of those 52 individuals, 23 completed graduation and post-graduation,254 
12 were diploma holders, and only 17 had attained school level (secondary and senior 
secondary) education.255 It seems that well-networked and prosperous Southern states of India, 
such as Kerala, Karnataka, Telangana and Maharashtra, appeared more prone to the IS’s 
propaganda than other States in India. The analysis of the education data of Indian foreign 
fighters in the context of respective states, proves that a low literacy rate is not responsible for 
the transformation of an individual into a jihadist.  
 
Employment 
In the crime-terror nexus, research shows that most of the European foreign fighters are 
part criminals ranging from petty criminals to local gangsters.256 According to the data, out of 
699 German foreign fighters, two-third (466) had police records and one-third (233) had 
criminal conviction prior to their travel to IS-controlled territories in Iraq or Syria. Similar 
patterns are found among French foreign fighters and law-enforcement officials from Norway 
and the Netherlands and claimed that at least 60% of their foreign fighters were previously 
involved in criminal offences.257  
 
Figure 6: Employment-wise classification of Indian foreign fighters 
                                                          
254 Note: 20 graduates and 3 postgraduates. 
255 PT, “Converted Hindus, Engineer among 52 IS terrorists held by NIA”,  Indian Express, 19 January 2017, 
Available from: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/converted-hindus-engineers-among-52-IS-terrorists-held-
by-nia/  
256 Rajan Basra, Peter R. Neumann, and Claudia Brunne, “Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists 
and the New Crime-Terror Nexus”, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political 
Violence, 2016, Available from: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-
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257 Ibid.  
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Considering the phenomenon of crime-terror nexus in the context of Indian foreign fighters, 
only three Indian had past criminal records as they were former members of indigenous terror 
outfit—IM, rest of them had clean criminal record. In terms of employment, in 1980s an 
Egyptian sociologist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim claimed that a high percentage of Egyptian Islamists 
were engineers and doctors who came from financially well-off families.258 This is similar to 
the contemporary phenomenon of Indian foreign fighters. Among 38 Indian foreign fighters, 
approximately 48% were employed whereas merely 5.26% were unemployed. Few of them 
were in medical and academic fields. According to a study, many foreign fighters in IS 
originated from countries with high level of economic development and political institutions.259 
Therefore, there is no correlation between employment levels and terrorism.  
 
Region 
 
 
Figure 7: Region-wise classification of Indian foreign fighters 
 
 The classification of region-wise data on foreign fighters and individuals who travelled 
got arrested either while trying to leave India or during nation-wide arrests conducted by NIA 
since 2015. Among the other eight states, the state of Kerala not only scored highest counts for 
foreign fighters who travelled but also the individuals who were arrested. Following Kerala, 
Maharashtra also has significant numbers of foreign fighters who travelled to IS controlled 
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Findings”, International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol 12 no. 4 (1980): 423-453. Available from: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/163128  
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regions. Among 38 individuals, one of the first Indian foreign fighter and a returnee—Areeb 
Majeed is from Kalyan city in the state of Maharashtra. His profile is discussed in later sections 
of this chapter. In these 38 foreign fighters, most of them belong to the Muslim community. 
The interesting point to consider is that according to the census of 2011, the population of 
Muslims in both states, Kerala and Maharashtra, considered as at significant level and at 
minority level respectively. In 2011 census, the Muslim population in state of Kerala was 
26.56% of the total population of India, whereas the Muslim population in state of Maharashtra 
was 11.54%.260 This describes that there is no direct relation between the numbers of foreign 
fighters and region-wise religious population.     
 
Converts 
 In the phenomenon of foreign fighters, the case of converts to Islam is noteworthy. An 
example of a foiled terrorist plot in Catalonia in 2015, where six out of 11 arrested IS operatives 
were converts to Islam,261 justifies the importance of converts in the case of foreign fighters. 
According to the ICCT’s report, 6% to 23% of European foreign fighters are converts whereas 
a 2014 report by The Soufan Group claimed that at an average 6% of European foreign fighters 
are converts to Islam.262 According to a study, three European Union member states, namely 
Belgium, France and Germany have an estimate 8.8%, 4.6% and 4.5% respectively of converts 
in their Muslim population,263 whereas these three countries also contributed to 6% (Belgium), 
23% (France) and 12% (Germany) converts respectively, in the total population of European 
foreign fighters.264 As per the data of 38 Indian foreign fighters, only 5 Indians (two men and 
three women)  reportedly converted to Islam from Christianity and Hinduism, which is around 
13% of the total Indian foreign fighters; higher than the convert percentages from Belgium and 
Germany.  
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In a news report, nearly 6,000 people converted to Islam in the state of Kerala between 2011 
and 2015.265 According to the same news report, two Islamic conversion centres in Kerala were 
mainly responsible for the conversion process but it is difficult to claim if these five converts 
from the Indian foreign fighters’ contingent, were among those converted people. As per report, 
around half of the converted were women and 76% of these women were under the age of 35 
years.266 Out of 38 Indian foreign fighters, three women were converted to Islam and were 
below 35 years of age, there is a possibility that these women were among those converted 
people during 2011-2015. 
 
 
Islamic State in Indian Cyberspace: A Long-Term Security Concern 
 
“The central and state agencies are monitoring the cyber space, which is being used to radicalise and recruit 
persons by IS, and the law enforcement agencies take action as per law.”267 
 
The above statement was made by the Indian Minister of State for Home Affairs 
Hansraj G. Ahir during a Parliamentary session in New Delhi, India. The phenomenon of 
cyberspace is anonymous and universally available to everyone. Social networking sites hosted 
anywhere in the world are monitored by the Indian law enforcement agencies in order to check 
and remove objectionable contents from the website in accordance with the provisions of 
Indian Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000.268 In modern-day terrorism, Internet plays a 
supportive non-violent weapon for terrorist organisation. In cyberspace, a strong urge to 
propagate the ideology draws a line as one of the differences among IS and other terrorist 
organisations. The ‘highly-active’ online presence in the use of Internet technology for luring 
recruits, planning and coordinating attacks and spreading propaganda are counted as the main 
activities of IS in cyberspace. In India, the group has been spreading its virtual ‘caliphate’ and 
targeting the Muslim community, especially the youth of India to become a potential jihadist. 
In their propaganda videos, the IS has highlighted India as a target. The videos are subtitled in 
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India’s regional languages such as Tamil,269 Telugu270 and other languages, calling Indian 
Muslims to join IS.271 This depicts IS’s well-planned social media presence in Indian 
cyberspace. In fact, Islamic State is not the only player to attract Indian Muslims towards its 
ideology but its rival group— al-Qaeda also marked its cyber presence through social media 
for recruitment purposes. In August 2016, al-Qaeda’s affiliated media group—Global Islamic 
Media Front (GIMF) broadcasted on its Telegram Channel information about the launch of a 
‘special channel’, titled ‘GIMF Subcontinent’, which focused on creation and dissemination of 
propaganda content in the context of the Indian Subcontinent.272 
 
The GMIF group declared to disseminate the propaganda-oriented messages and visuals in 
India’s national and regional languages such as Hindi,273 Bengali,274 Urdu,275 Tamil276 and 
Malayalam.277 Reportedly, this is the first time when al-Qaeda had gone local to target the 
people from southern regions of Tamil Nadu and Kerala in an urge to spread its ideological 
propaganda of sharia law, the violent conflict in Syria and Afghanistan  offering a membership 
to Indian Muslim youth by joining jihad.278 The step of distributing the message in local 
languages by al-Qaeda can be seen as a counter-step against IS’s propaganda targeting India. 
There are multiple layers of threat by IS in the context of India, and its growing presence on 
Internet especially the social media networks is a concern for India’s intelligence and cyber 
authorities. After the Paris attacks in November 2015, India’s Ministry of Home Affairs issued 
an advisory to its States and Union Territories (hereafter UTs) stating that the IS’s success in 
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recruiting youth through online activities and the possibility of affiliating with the terrorist 
groups operating in India have opened an enormous probability of IS-sponsored terrorist 
attacks on Indian soil.279 In 2015, a strategic report prepared by the Internet And Mobile 
Association of India (IAMAI), regarding the impact of Internet and social media on Indian 
economy and society as a whole, it is stated that the country’s Internet population base will 
cross 500 million in 2018, with an increase of rural Internet users alone from 60 million in June 
2014 to 280 million in 2018, providing government’s initiative of National Optic Fibre 
Network (NOFN).280 Taking the estimate provided by IAMAI, the Internet audience in India 
is a ‘ripe fruit’ for terrorist organisations like IS.  
 
The Indian intelligence agencies believe that Yousuf al-Hindi or Shafi Armar, as an ally of Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi and an appointed recruiter for IS’s Indian module,  reportedly recruited 
around 30 Indian Muslims and was in touch with another 600 to 700 potential members through 
different social media platforms mainly Facebook and WhatsApp.281 On the condition of 
anonymity, a senior official from India’s counterterrorism group revealed that although some 
social media accounts of jihadi groups announced Shafi Armar’s death, but as per the 
intelligence information, Shafi is very much alive and is communicating with potential 
recruits— who are under the surveillance of Indian intelligence agencies for expressing jihadi 
inclinations.282 According to news reports, till December 2015, around 150 Indians from 
Southern regions were under surveillance for their alleged sympathies towards IS, and 30 were 
arrested while seeking to join IS in the conflict zones of Iraq and Syria.283 Such concerns of 
online radicalisation led the Ministry of Home Affairs to announce an establishment of a multi-
agency 24x7 ‘Social Media Analysis Centre’ to monitor online recruitments of terrorist 
organisations.284  
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The nation-wide arrests of IS sympathisers in India since 2015 who were radicalised over the 
Internet, is a significant evidence of IS’s foothold in India.  In one of the many cases where 
Internet activities were involved, the National Investigation Agency filed charge sheets against 
three accused persons who created multiple email IDs, used multiple mobile numbers obtained 
from their associates in different countries, formed various online forums and groups on 
Facebook, WhatsApp, KiK, VKontakte, Viber and Skype, using the Internet and invited like-
minded people from different parts of the world and thereby acted as a frontal group of the 
IS.285 More than two dozens of IS’s sympathisers arrested by the NIA confessed during their 
interrogation that they were indoctrinated by Shafi Armar.286 As a part of modus operandi of 
Armar’s online recruitment strategy, the potential recruit could join the Facebook page and 
immediately receive the personal message from Armar or Yusuf. Later, Armar would create a 
skype account for the recruit with several chat names in regional languages.287 According to 
the news report, Armar preferred chatting with potential recruits about the atrocities on Indian 
Muslim community, over the social networking application- Trillian.288 Showing cruelty in 
‘real’ and ‘virtual/cyber’ world, clearly IS has mastered the art of serving terror and ideology 
in one platter. The success rate of IS’s online activities can be easily guessed through a study 
conducted by the Centre of Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution on IS propaganda 
on Twitter. The research group had collected roughly 50,000 Twitter accounts out of which an 
estimate of minimum of 30,000 Twitter accounts were accurately described as accounts 
belonging to IS’s supporters or sympathisers.289 These numbers may have increased by now as 
the study was conducted in March 2015. The Indian intelligence agencies believe that IS’s 
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social media propaganda is initiating competition among other terrorist organisations, 
especially the cross-border based jihadi groups, to impersonate IS’s recruitment strategies.290     
 
Islamic State’s Indian-Cyber ‘Game Players’ 
 
Afsha Jabeen aka Nicky Joseph 
Afsha Jabeen is the first Indian woman convicted for her role as an ‘online recruiter’ 
for IS. She was based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and with the cooperation between 
India and UAE at the intelligence level, she was deported to India and was arrested by law-
enforcement officials at Hyderabad Airport (now in Telangana). Indian intelligence agencies 
were monitoring the activities of one of the suspects named Salman Mohiuddin, a US returnee 
chemical engineer and they arrested him in January 2015 at the Hyderabad airport. During the 
interrogation, Mohiuddin confessed that while surfing for Islamic religious texts, he and ‘Nicky 
Joseph’, a British national living in Dubai, opened several Facebook accounts to lure the Indian 
young Muslims for IS.291 Born in Hyderabad, Afsha Jabeen, did her schooling in Indian Islahi 
Islamic School in Abu Dhabi till Higher Secondary in 1996. Later, she moved to India and 
studied Bachelor degree in Commerce (B. Com) from Shadan College, Hyderabad from 1996 
to 1999. In 2000, she met Devendra Batra, a paying guest in Jabeen’s house in Hyderabad and 
got married in August 2000 in accordance to Hindu and Muslim wedding traditions. 
In her confessional statement to Intelligence officials, Jabeen strongly agreed on her support 
for the Islamic State and the methods she applied to motivate the Indian Muslim youth by 
sharing the propaganda video via Facebook page ‘Islam vs Christianity Friendly Discussion’ 
to promote Islam and thereafter she used the pseudonym ‘Nicky Joseph’. As told by Jabeen, 
all the members of her Facebook group are ‘very strong’ online sympathisers of IS, especially 
a student from Kashmir and a man in Dubai, originally from Kerala, who were ’blind supporters 
of IS and highly radicalised’.292 Like Moihuddin, she also claimed to be an administrator of 
four Facebook groups—'Revelations and Hadith’ (in 2012), ‘Daula Islamia’ (in August 2014), 
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‘Moderators vs. Liberals’ (in November 2014) and ‘Daula News Room’ (in November 2014). 
As reported, Afsha claimed that she used to follow the speeches and writings of Jaish-e-
Mohammed chief Maulana Masood Azhar, UK-based Mohammed Mizanur Rahman alias Abu 
al-Bara and controversial preacher Anjem Choudary, American Muslim scholar and writer of 
Pakistani descent Yasir Qadhi, South African writer and public speaker of Indian descent 
Ahmed Deedat, Ghuraba al-Muhajir of Pakistan and Mumbai-based Islamic tele-evangelist Dr 
Zakir Naik.293 
 
Mehdi Masroor Biswas  
 
Mehdi Masroor Biswas, 24-year old electrical engineer by profession, is a resident of 
Bangalore, Karnataka, and one of the online sympathisers of IS arrested by the Indian 
Intelligence agency. Mehdi was running the most influential pro-IS Twitter handle— 
@shamiwitness. A native of West Bengal, Biswas moved to Bangalore with his family and was 
employed as an executive in a multinational company. Through his Twitter account 
@shamiwitness, Biswas was the one of the voices of IS on Twitter. His tweets were seen two 
million times each month, making him the most influential IS propagandist, with over 17,000 
followers.294 He has been involved in broadcasting the ‘IS terror’ and luring ‘potential’ recruits 
to fight for the so-called jihad.  
 According to the report by The Times of India in 2014, Biswas was under the impression that 
he would never get caught by the law-enforcement agencies and always introduced himself as 
a Libyan citizen living in the UK to his followers and never revealed his real identity and 
location on Twitter.295 Being tech-savvy, Biswas masked his static IP address to prevent the 
immediate tracking of his location, but on the basis of Intelligence reports, police traced his 
mobile number and eventually arrested him from his house in Jalahalli, Bangalore. In an 
interview with UK’s Channel 4 News, Mehdi M. Biswas admitted that he is impressed and 
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sympathise with the ideology of IS. “If I had chance to leave everything and join them (IS) I 
might have….my family needs me here.” Mehdi expressed to Channel 4 News.296 
 
Muddabir Mushtaq Shaikh 
In February 2016, Muddabir Mushtaq Shaikh, a 34-year old software engineer based in 
Mumbai, Maharashtra, was arrested along with several others in a crack-down by the NIA.297 
Muddabir M. Shaikh aka Abu Musab was given his name by Syria-based Indian IS handler, 
Shafi Armar aka Yousuf, a  former member of IM who later affiliated with IS. Muddabir’s job 
was to locate the potential recruits from India through Internet. The ‘hunting’ method includes 
a search for accounts of people who reacted positively on the propaganda of Islam and watched 
videos of radical speeches by Islamic clerics, after this primary probe individuals were traced, 
contacted and then encouraged to join IS.298  
Being a computer professional, Mudabbir worked in various organisations. At his last job as a 
‘Product Development Manager’ in Sportz Interactive, Mumbai— where he worked for five 
years, he was ‘asked to leave’ because of his poor performance and he left the company in 
2012. When Mudabbir started freelance work from home, he started reading about IS over the 
Internet. During his interrogation, Mudabbir claimed that while searching on the Internet 
regarding the Caliphate, he came across the profile of Yousuf-al Hindi and they became friends 
on Facebook. Yousuf-al Hindi is none other than Shafi Armar, member of IS and a former 
member of IM.299  
 
Conclusion 
 Foreign fighters are armed combatants who are radically motivated to leave their home 
country to get trained or fight on behalf of a violent extremist organisation in distant conflict 
zones. In general, the phenomenon of foreign fighters is difficult to quantitatively measure as 
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much of the information is retained with the security agencies and inaccessible for research 
purposes. Likewise, European countries, the propaganda wave of IS’ global Caliphate reached 
the Indian subcontinent too and some good numbers of individuals from Pakistan (330), 
Afghanistan (50), China (300) travelled to IS-controlled territories in Iraq and Syria. This wave 
hits Indian population too and merely 23 were reported to have travelled to join IS.300 However, 
the author has managed to collect and maintain a dataset of 38 Indian foreign fighters from 
different states of India. Regarding the responsible factors behind mobilisation of Indians, 
unlike the foreign fighters from the European Union, Indian foreign fighters were not a 
migrated generation in India but born and bred from the Indian soil. During the process of 
radicalisation, the occurrence of different events in India such as the demolition of Babri Masjid 
in 1992, Gujarat riots in 2002, and Muzaffarnagar riots in 2014, as a sign of atrocities on the 
Indian Muslim community, might have influenced aspects of foreign fighter decision-making 
process.  
As reported, the Indian Home Minister, Rajnath Singh has stated on several occasions that 
Islamic State is not an immediate threat to India and the cultural roots of Indian youth are strong 
enough against the process of radicalisation. The fewer counts of Indian foreign fighters in IS 
are not posing a serious threat. The threat of IS or al-Qaeda does not come from its main group 
but through the cooperation with like-minded ideological terrorist factions based in Pakistan, a 
country that is considered as a haven for terrorist groups. In 2015, IS and all its manifestations 
were listed under the ‘banned terrorist organisation’ under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
Act, 1967. Since then, Indian intelligence agencies are maintaining a close watch to identify 
people engaged in anti-national activities, preaching to mislead the youth towards 
radicalisation. The vast availability of social-media has enabled terrorist organisations to reach 
out to global audience with their radical propaganda. Three Indians apprehended by Indian law-
enforcement agencies were well-known supporters of IS’s global Caliphate over cyberspace 
and allegedly engaged in online recruitment and other related activities. Since late 2015, India’s 
National Investigation Agency, with the cooperation with other Indian intelligence agencies 
had busted many IS related modules and neutralised major terror attack plans. According to an 
official of National Investigation Agency, to deal with radicalisation and contain the threat of 
IS in India, various steps are being undertaken by the law-enforcement agencies, details of 
                                                          
300 Note: Official figure by The Soufan Group in their December 2015 assessment report on foreign fighters in 
Syria. Available from: http://soufangroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate_FINAL3.pdf 
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which were not available in the interest of national security.301 Though IS has not been able to 
attract many people from India but the establishment of IS-Khorasan module in 2014 remains 
a long-term security threat for India. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
301 Interview with an official of National Investigation Agency by the author, Delhi, India, 28 February 2017. 
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Chapter Four 
The Threat to India from Returnee Islamic State 
Fighters 
 
Introduction 
The phenomenon of foreign fighters is not new. Foreign fighters have played roles in 
conflicts at different times. In June 2014, European Union’s Counterterrorism Coordinator 
Gilles de Kerchove estimated that more than 2,000 Europeans are involved in conflicts in 
Syria.302 the recent scale of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria has surpassed the Afghan-Soviet 
conflict during 1980-1992, where the so-called Afghan jihad lured around 20,000 foreign 
fighters.303 These fighters travelling to distant conflict zones and forming new networks and 
military-combat experiences. Such experience may pose a serious threat upon their return to 
their countries. Being equipped with cultural knowledge and fighting skills, these returnees are 
a challenge for law-enforcement agencies. The 2013 ‘Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) 
Report’ of Europol stated that returning fighters from Iraq or Syria have the potential to practise 
their battlefield experience, training for terrorist activities inside the European Union 
countries.304 This statement was supported by the Europol’s Director Rob Wainright in TE-
SAT report 2014, that the returning fighters may evoke others to join the armed struggle and 
conduct violent activities within the borders of the European Union.305 In past conflicts such 
as the Afghan-Soviet war, conflicts in Bosnia and Somalia, many foreign fighters killed during 
combat but there were numbers of fighters who returned to their countries including Europeans, 
                                                          
302 Adrian Croft, “ISIL may be directing attacks in Europe- EU official”, Reuters, 19 June 2014, Available from: 
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53-94. Available from: 
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with the sense of fulfilling their Islamic duty and to live normal lives with family.306 In the case 
of Europe, of all jihadist terrorists who have been arrested and convicted for alleged terrorist 
activities between 2001-2009, about twelve percent were likely to travel abroad prior to their 
attacks, either for ideological, military training or combative participation in conflicts.307 
Supporting the statement about the threat pose by returnee foreign fighters, Thomas 
Hegghammer claimed that a ‘veteran effect’ makes a returnee more lethal operative.308  
A returnee foreign fighter, if not arrested, likely to involved either in planning further attacks 
as a ‘lone-wolf’ actor or coordinate to radicalise and recruit potential fighters. There were few 
reported cases of returnee foreign fighters’ involvement in executing an attack in Europe.309 In 
2014, a French returnee foreign fighter, Mehdi Nemmouche, attacked and killed four people in 
Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium. In same year, IS’s French foreign fighter, Ibrahim 
Boudina, returned to France and was arrested while allegedly plotting an attack involving high-
grade explosives.310 On contrary, some returnee foreign fighters were disappointed with their 
experiences in conflict and would prefer to start a new life at home, including re-integration 
into the society. Denmark and Germany have adopted some liberal approaches of re-integrating 
the returning foreign fighters. For example, a German foreign fighter Kreshnik Berisha was 
returned home after disappointment and traumatised experience in the conflict zone. On the 
condition of a public confession and sharing the intelligence inputs of IS command structure, 
his prison sentence was reduced from 10 years to three years and nine months.311 Therefore, it 
is challenging for the government agencies to determine that among all returnee foreign fighters 
                                                          
306 Edwin Bakker, Christoph Paulussen and Eva Entenmann, “Retuning Jihadist Foreign Fighters: Challenges 
Pertaining to Threat Assessment and Governance of this Pan-European Problem”, Security and Human Rights 
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307 Ibid. 
308 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I stay, or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice 
between Domestic and Foreign Fighting”, American Political Science Review, February 2013, Available from: 
http://hegghammer.com/_files/Hegghammer_-_Should_I_stay_or_should_I_go.pdf  
309 Edwin Bakker, Christoph Paulussen and Eva Entenmann, “Retuning Jihadist Foreign Fighters: Challenges 
Pertaining to Threat Assessment and Governance of this Pan-European Problem”, Security and Human Rights 
Vol 25 (2014): 11-32. Available from: 
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311 “Germany jails Islamic State jihadist Kreshnik Berisha”, BBC News, 5 December 2014, Available from: 
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who is a potential threat to the national security or who is suitable to be a re-integrated in the 
society.312  
 
Actual Threat to India: Home-Grown Jihadists or Returnee Foreign Fighters? 
 Post-Independence from the British Colonialism in 1947, India as a sovereign and 
secular state has faced insurgency and terrorist attacks by non-state actors, largely supported 
by state actors. Apart from bomb blasts in different cities, the most notable attacks were the 
Indian Parliament attack in 2001 and Mumbai attack in 2008. According to a report by the US 
State Department, India was ranked high among countries that faced terrorist attacks in 2015.313   
In 2014, a year in which IS’s self-declared leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi called for a movement 
of Muslim community around the world to travelled to Iraq and join the IS. The mobilisation 
of Indian foreign fighters to join IS in Iraq or Syria, is minimal in comparison to the counts of 
foreign fighters from the European Union countries. According to the Soufan Group’s 
assessment report in 2015 on foreign fighters in Syria, around 23 Indian youths travelled to IS-
controlled territories in Iraq and Syria.314 Whereas according to the database compiled by the 
author for this research, since 2014 till mid-2017, total 38 Indians have been travelled to IS-
controlled zones in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan (allegedly IS base camp in Nangahar province 
of Afghanistan). As the numbers are very few in comparison to India’s total population, the 
phenomenon of foreign fighters does not raise any serious concern regarding national security 
issues. But the possibility of vulnerability cannot be ignored if looking at the frequent 
infiltration activities by the cross-border terrorist groups, mainly based in either Pakistan or 
Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (PoK). Regarding IS threat to India— in a press conference in 
May 2017, the Indian Minister of Home Affairs Rajnath Singh stated that despite of the second-
largest Muslim population of the world, IS has failed to set foot in India. So far, more than 90 
IS sympathisers have been arrested by law enforcement agencies, which shows success in 
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countering challenges posed by IS.315 The Indian government has not confirmed any 
information on public platform regarding its own citizens travelled as foreign fighters. Few 
questions such as how many Indians have joined IS, how many have died or what are their 
status, are still unanswered. It can be understood that the sharing of sensitive information 
regarding Indian foreign fighters may have different results at the domestic security level, 
therefore most of the data is kept confidential and publicly undisclosed by the intelligence 
agencies.  
In mid-May 2016, Indian media shows a first IS video featuring Indian jihadists riding a small 
boat and showing off their Kalashnikovs with the IS’s black flag in the background. This video 
is a first of its kind which focuses on India and its propaganda of Indian foreign fighters in its 
ranks.316 Unlike the case of European foreign fighters who are privileged with free travel 
through Schengen region317 and may pose a threat of an attack upon their return; Indian foreign 
fighters do no enjoy such benefit of free travel and therefore, either has immediate and limited 
option— either to be killed during the fight or to return to India. Assuming the probability of 
Indian foreign fighters as returnees, out of 38 Indian foreign fighters listed in the database, 14 
Indian foreign fighters are killed in the battlefield where as two Indian foreign fighters made 
return to India. As compare to European figures of foreign fighters killed, the percentage rate 
of India’s foreign fighters is higher with 36.84 percent. Reportedly, only two Indian foreign 
fighters— Areeb Majeed and Subahani Haja Moideen returned to India in late-2014 and mid-
2016 respectively and were arrested by the Indian law-enforcement officials. Considering the 
rate of ‘dead’ Indian foreign fighters, there are low chances of the return of remaining 22 Indian 
foreign fighters (including six women). 
 
Terrorism in India and India’s Stand on Counterterrorism 
Measuring the impact of terrorism on India, the 2016 report of Global Terrorism Index 
rated India at 8th place after Iraq (1st), Afghanistan (2nd), Nigeria (3rd), Pakistan (4th), Syria (5th), 
                                                          
315 PTI, “Islamic State failed in India despite large Muslim population: Rajnath Singh”, Hindustan Times, 03 
June 2017, Available from: http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/islamic-state-failed-in-india-despite-
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317 Note: A region in Europe comprising of 26 countries that have eliminated the border controls with other 
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Yemen (6th) and Somalia (7th). Whereas in 2015 report, India was placed at 6th place because 
of the highest numbers of terrorist attacks since 2000.318 In India, the incidents of terrorism 
have varied from local political goals to stringent military operations. So far, there has been no 
reported terrorist attacks in which trans-national organisations such as Al-Qaeda or IS played 
a direct and active role. The political demands of the Sikh separate nation, Kashmir Separatist 
issues issue and North-East separation issues has been marked as the main terrorism issue until 
the wave of Islamic extremism that gave birth to India’s only native Islamic terrorist group- 
Indian Mujahideen (IM). Although the indigenous group IM was dismantled with the arrest of 
its top leaders and there are no reported incidents post the notorious 2008 Mumbai attacks has 
appeared, therefore, it is difficult to assume if the splinter cells related to IM or other 
‘underground’ indigenous Islamic extremist groups are in active mode  to coordinate a terrorist 
attack on Indian soil. 
 
1984-1990: The Khalistan Movement 
In 1980s, the demand of separate ‘Sikh country’ or commonly known as ‘Khalistan’ by 
Sikh separatists gave a boil inside the Indian politics and a rise to the ‘Sikh Panjabi nationalist 
movement’ in Indian state of Punjab. An orthodox religious leader— Jarnail Singh 
Bhinderwale who was once favourite of then-ruling party Indian National Congress to establish 
the political move in Punjab, turned to be a rebellion and formed a militancy group with the 
ideology of Khalistani separatists. The armed members of this group started violence against 
non-Sikh population in the state of Punjab and succeeded in radicalising the youth of Punjab 
to join the separatist movement. As the state of Punjab was turning into a hub of Sikh militancy, 
then-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took the decision and ordered a military action code 
named ‘Operation Blue Star’— with an objective to eliminate the group leader Jarnail Singh 
Bhinderwale. As a result, in June 1984 military operation Jarnail Singh Bhinderwale was killed, 
along with there were many causalities of military personnel and civilians but the sacred Sikh 
place ‘Shri Harmandir Sahib’- popularly known as the Golden Temple’s various buildings were 
significantly damaged. Eventually, this operation deeply hurt the religious sentiments of Sikh 
community in whole country. As a revenge of ‘Operation Blue Star’, then-Indian Prime 
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Minister—Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her own two Sikh bodyguards.319 Her death 
brought infamous 1984 Sikh riots in which thousands of Sikhs were killed in Delhi by Hindu 
mobs as a revenge of their favourite politician. After two years, the Golden temple was seized 
by the armed members of All India Sikhs Students Federation and Damdami Taksal- a religious 
group once headed by Jarnail Singh Bhinderwale, favouring the creation of a separate Sikh 
nation- the ‘Khalistan’.320 In early 1990s, the Indian security forces suppressed the insurgency 
in Punjab. The pro-Khalistan groups such as Dal Khalsa (International) is active outside India, 
propagating the ideology of Khalistan among the Sikh diaspora around the World.321 Recently, 
after the silent but strategic gap of three decades, the pro-Khalistani separatist groups have 
placed controversial banners demanding the referendum and separation of the state Punjab 
from India. The hoardings with the clear message: “Azadi Hi Hal (literally translated as: 
Independence is the only solution), Punjab Independence, 2020 referendum” were spotted at 
different locations in the state of Punjab. The state government has not taken any action against 
this separatists’ move.322 
 
1990s- Ongoing: The Kashmir Conflict 
 The dispute over territory of Kashmir, which is a northern part of the Indian state of 
Jammu and Kashmir, is a focal point of conflict between India and Pakistan over one-third of 
occupation by the Pakistan, popularly known as Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir or PoK. The 
dispute trailed back to 1947, an era of India’s independence from the British rule and creation 
of Pakistan. Since the late 1980s, the Kashmir valley witnessed the uprising of local militant 
groups and separatists seeking independence of Kashmir from India and according to the 
security experts, these groups are financially and logistically supported by the Pakistan’s 
intelligence agency ISI to wage a proxy war with India.323 Though Islamic terrorism has no 
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geographical boundaries but in the context of the Kashmir conflict, it is a good example. The 
militancy in Kashmir was started in 1990s by the Kashmiri youth but was later hijacked by the 
Pakistan/PoK-based terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and 
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), either directly or indirectly with the support from ISI.324 In 
prolonged and ongoing militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, 13936 civilians and 5,043 security 
forces personnel have been killed.325 After a regular Friday prayer in October 2014, some 
masked protesters were seen waving the flags of IS and Pakistan in Jama Masjid area in 
Srinagar, Kashmir. Since IS’s announcement of the Caliphate in mid-2014, the Indian security 
forces have seen the flag of transnational terror outfit for fourth time in three months in the 
Kashmir Valley.326 “The emergence of the IS flags merits concern and deserves the high 
attention of security agencies to prevent the youth of Kashmir from getting lured into IS.”, said 
a senior-ranked Indian Army officer regarding the appearance of IS flags in the valley.327 
2016: Unrest Over Killing of Militant Commander 
The wave of terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir from 2013 to 2016 can be 
understood from the table given below:  
Year Incidents Security Forces 
Personnel Killed 
Civilians Killed Terrorist Killed 
2013 170 53 15 67 
2014 222 47 28 110 
2015 208 39 17 108 
2016 322 82 15 150 
Table 1: Trends of Terrorist Violence in Jammu and Kashmir from 2013 to 2016.328 
As shown in Table 1, there is a significant increase in terrorist incidents and killings of 
security forces personnel in 2016. It might reflect the change in Pakistan’s proxy-war strategy 
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against India, where the ISI-supported terror groups, such as LeT, HM and JeM propagating 
the violence against Indian security forces through radicalisation over social media. In February 
2016, clashes between Afzal Guru’s sympathisers and security forces broke-out after the Friday 
prayers. Though the stone-pelting at security forces, the violent protesters raised the flags of 
Pakistan and IS, also displayed the banners saying, “Thank you JNU (Jawaharlal Nehru 
University)”.329 In response, the security forces fired tear-smoke canisters to disperse the 
protesters.330 In July 2016, the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani, sparked 
the unrest in the Kashmir Valley. The ‘anti-government’ violent protest started in 10  districts 
of Kashmir Valley where violent protesters denied the  implementation of curfew following 
the killing of Burhan Wani and started attacks on security forces and public properties.331 In 
clashes with violent protesters, 96 security personnel were injured and 11 people died with over 
200 people injured.332 As often, Pakistani flags are waved by the violent protesters during the 
protest bur for the first time, Chinese flags were found during the raids at various locations, 
intelligence officials believe that to irritate the security forces, the violent protesters used 
Chinese flags. 
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Figure 9: Masked protestors waving flags of IS/ISJK (Islamic State-Jammu and Kashmir), Pakistan, LeT and 
poster of Hizb ul-Mujahideen (HM) commander, Burhan Wani; Source: Google Images 
In February 2017, after a regular Friday prayer, the violent protesters again erupted the clashes, 
waving Pakistan, IS and Lashkar-e-Taiba flags. A group of masked violent protestors had 
initiate stone-pelting on police, paramilitary personnel in downtown Srinagar, chanting Pro-
Pakistan and anti-India slogans.333  
In his statement a day on 17 February 2017, Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat issue a 
strong warning saying that “stone-pelters interfering in security forces’ anti-terror operations 
will be treated as ‘over-ground’ workers of terrorists and be fired upon.”334 During an 
investigation, Indian news media, India Today interviews five stone-pelters/violent protesters 
from the district of Baramulla because of their anonymity. The violent protesters confessed that 
an amount of INR 5,000 – 7,000 ($78-108) per month along with clothes and shoes, some of 
them received separate funds to make petrol bombs. Upon asking, the violent protesters refused 
to reveal the identity of their sponsors by saying that “we will die but won’t reveal their names. 
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It’s a question of our bread and butter”.335 Even children are included in this protest based on 
getting paid, a good physique boy will earn around INR 7,000 ($108) whereas physically weak 
boy will get around INR 6,000 ($92).336 In its report on Kashmir protests, the Intelligence 
Bureau stated that huge amount of money was sent by Pakistan’s ISI  via terrorists across the 
launchpads in PoK region and further the money was delivered to the separatists through ‘touts’ 
and ‘hawala’ channels.337 To an estimate, around INR 800 crore  was supplied to Kashmiri 
Separatist leaders including Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Asiya Andrabi to provoke the unrest 
in the valley.338 On the basis of inputs from the Intelligence Bureau, the National Investigation 
Agency (NIA) initiated the preliminary inquiry against three separatist leaders, including Syed 
Ali Shah Geelani, for allegedly receiving funds from Hafiz Saeed (co-founder of Lashkar-e-
Taiba) to carry-out seditious activities, including throwing stones on security forces, damaging 
public property, schools and other government establishments.339 The matter is still under the 
investigation process.  
In July 2017, like every year the 40 -day long annual pilgrimage of the Hindus - the Amarnath 
Yatra to the holy cave shrine of Amarnath in South Kashmir, commenced under the shadow of 
threats from terrorist groups in the valley. In June 2017, the Indian intelligence agencies shared 
an input on ‘highly-likely’ terrorist attack during the Amarnath Yatra, with the Army, Central 
Reserve Police Force, and senior rank officer in the state police. According to the report, 
“terrorist have been directed to eliminate 100 to 150 pilgrims and about 100 police officers and 
officials.”340 Due to the increased threat and violence in Kashmir, around 40,000 security forces 
personnel has mobilised by the government in the region to ensure the incident free 
pilgrimage.341 But, on 10 July 2017, after few days of the alert, the militants openly fired on a 
bus and a security vehicle returning with first-batch of pilgrims from the shrine of Amarnath, 
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in Anantnag district of Kashmir. As per the reports, at least seven civilians are dead and several 
wounded, including security forces personnel in this terrorist attack.342 Condemning the attack, 
the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted that “India will never get bogged down by 
such cowardly attacks and the evil designs of hate.”343 It is unclear if there is communication 
gap or lack of utmost coordination among the security agencies and state law-enforcement 
bodies which results to the occurrence of a terrorist attack despite of high-level alerts.  
 
Naxalites-Maoists Insurgents: A ‘Local’ Terror Group 
 Other than the threats from radical Islamic groups based in PoK and Pakistan, Naxals 
is the indigenous armed group that remains as serious security concern for India from the last 
50 years. Naxalism derived its name from Naxalbari,344 added a new dimension to the 
insurgency activities in India. Inspired from the Maoist ideology, the Naxalite movement 
started in 1967 as an armed struggle to re-distribute the land to the landless farmers in West 
Bengal. Naxals is a group of far-left communists from the Communist Party of India (Marxist). 
A small dispute between a sharecropper and landlord’s men over a land dispute. When a police 
inspector approached the ‘tribal’ villagers of Naxalbari to investigate the matter, they shot 
arrows and killed the Inspector.345 Upon the demand of the surrender of the guilty shooters, the 
reinforcement force was attacked with more arrows which results to massive clash between the 
‘tribal villagers’ and police force.346 Initially it was highly active in the state of West Bengal 
but later spread-out its activities to the southern and eastern states such as Chhattisgarh, Odisha, 
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Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.347 The operative area of Naxals is mainly referred as 
‘Red Corridor’.348  
The main cause behind the Naxal revolution was the failure of the then-Government of India 
in implementation of constitutional reforms in favour tribal population on their own land such 
as distribution of excess land to landless farmers and labourers.349 The allocation of tribal areas 
and illegal alienation of villagers gave rise to the Naxalite movement, which is ongoing since 
1967. The Naxal terrorism reached its peak point during 1970-1972, but quickly suppressed by 
the Indian armed forces. In 1975, the armed revolution of naxals was wiped-out not only from 
the state of West Bengal but from the adjoining regions too.350 Though the naxals were out of 
the region but the continued exploitation of the ‘tribal’ villagers gave another base to the 
communist activists. In 2006, according to an estimate of an Indian intelligence official, the 
counts of naxals were 20,000 and over a quarter of India’s 600 districts were under the 
influence of Naxal terrorism.351 However, in another estimate, the Naxal counts were over 
50,000 equipped with modern weapons and well-honed guerrilla strategy in 13 Indian states.352 
In 2009, Naxalites were active in approximately 180 districts of 10  States of India353 but by 
the end of 2011, only 83 districts of nine Indian states were under the influence of Naxalite 
terrorism.354 In his speech in 2010, then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that 
“Naxalism remains the biggest internal security challenge and it is imperative to control Left-
Wing extremism for the Country’s growth”.355 In September 2011, then-Minister of Home 
Affairs  P. Chidambaram expressed the concern of Naxal terrorism in his statement that, “while 
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26 persons were killed in terrorist violence and 46 killed in insurgency (27 in Jammu and 
Kashmir), 297 persons were killed in Naxal violence, which is 10  times of those killed in terror 
incidents.”356 Since inception as an armed group, the notable Naxalite attack was on 06 April 
2010, in which 75  Indian security forces (paramilitary and reserve police force) personnel were 
killed and 50  were wounded in a series of attack on security forces’ convoy in Dantewada 
district of the Indian state of Chhattisgarh.357 The recent attack claimed by Naxalites was  on 
24 April 2017 in Sukma district of Chhattisgarh. The ambush attack on Indian security forces 
killed 26 Indian security force personnel and six were severely injured.358 According to an 
estimate, over 12,000 people (including Indian security forces personnel and civilians) have 
been killed by Naxals in past  20 years. Replying to an RTI inquiry, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs revealed that out of total 12,183 people killed, 9,471 were civilians and 2,712 were 
Central and State security force personnel.359 
The political face of Naxals— the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and the Communist Party 
of India (Marxist-Leninist)— People’s War, all its formations and front organisations are 
enlisted in India’s ‘list of banned organisations under Section 35 of Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Act 1967.360 According to the Ministry of Home Affair’s ‘Annual Report 2016-
2017’, in fight against Left-Wing extremism/Naxals, the Indian forces arrested 125 naxals and 
333 naxals surrendered, with seizure of heavy ammunition and arms during the period April 
2016-December 2016.361 As per the tentative data in a report on ‘Left-Wing Extremism/Naxals’ 
up to June 2017, 445 incidents are recorded with 153 casualties (90 civilians and 63 security 
forces personnel), 839 Naxalites were arrested and 408 Naxalites surrendered.362  The Ministry 
of Home Affairs has a separate division ‘Left Wing Extremism’ to deal with the issues related 
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to Naxalite-Maoist insurgency. This division monitors the ‘Left-Wing Extremism’ situation 
and counter measures being taken by the affected states’ administration. Further, along with 
aggressive military action against naxals, as a part of holistic approach to tackle ‘Left-Wing 
Extremism’/Naxalites/Maoists threat, the government has applied an ‘Action Plan’ which 
focuses to address the security, development and governance deficit in 106 Left-Wing 
Extremism affected districts in seven states.363 Regardless of Government’s development 
initiatives, the Naxal insurgency is continuing to hold-back the essential developments for the 
future of Naxal-affected regions.  
 
India’s Counterterrorism Policy 
 According to some experts, India’s response to a terrorist incident is a passive response 
which appears to be a short-term measure to counter the long-run problem.364 In words of an 
Indian Army’s Retired  Major General Sheru Thapiyal, who works at the Centre for Land 
Warfare Studies based in New Delhi, “India lacks a coherent strategic response to terrorism; 
there is no doctrine, and most of our responses are kneejerk”.365 The terrorist groups does take 
an advantage of loopholes in India’s counterterrorism policy’s architecture which mostly stamp 
the minorities, particularly the strong Muslim community of India.366 In past, for every attack, 
India’s Central and State intelligence agencies relied on past experiences and linked the attacks 
with Pakistan/PoK based terror outfits, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad but neglected 
the alliance between Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) and India’s indigenous Students Islamic 
Movement of India (SIMI) which was  a banned group of young Indian Muslim activists who 
deliberately and openly claimed al-Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden as their idol.367 
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Law-Enforcement’s Initiatives on Countering IS 
The Indian state of Uttar Pradesh’s Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) started a program 
named as ‘Ghar-Wapsi’ or ‘Home-Coming’ to de-radicalised youth who were inspired from 
the ideology of IS.368 According to a senior ranked Indian Police officer, Aseem Arun, “around 
12 people across the state of Uttar Pradesh will be de-radicalised under the program.” The 
unemployment situation in the state was one of the reasons of turning it into a breeding ground 
for radical-extremist ideology. Under the de-radicalisation process, the support from family, 
friends and religious leaders will play an essential role.369 There are significant number of cases 
where the Maharashtra ATS dealt with youngsters getting radicalised online and joined IS. The 
first group of four youngsters, including Areeb Majeed, that belonged to urban areas of 
Maharashtra. To counter the radicalisation among Indian youth, the Indian State Maharashtra 
ATS aired a social awareness video about online radicalisation, which is a first-ever step taken 
by any Indian state police. The video shows a young aspiring student’s parents talking about 
their son’s success in studies and dedication to work on computer during the extended hours, 
but later the video shows that the aspiring student was watching a tutorial on Internet about 
making bombs. The officials of ATS shows up to parents and tells them about their son’s online 
extremist activities. The video ends with a message given by an Indian celebrity, urging parents 
and friends to become responsible and keep alert about their children and friend’s online 
activities.370 According to the news report, some of the Indian foreign fighters in IS came from 
urban areas, including Mumbai, Maharashtra, therefore to establish a link with the 
radicalisation and terror group IS, the video shows the same aspiring engineer transferring 
funds to ‘Syria’.371   
During mid-2016, most of the Indian foreign fighters travelled from the Indian state of Kerala, 
a state with higher literacy rate in comparison to other states of the country. A campaign 
initiated by the Kerala Police named as ‘Operation Pigeon’ focuses on the de-radicalisation of 
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Indian youths who were contacted by the IS handlers as a primary step of IS’s recruitment 
drive.372 As a part of this campaign, various agencies mined the social media for extremist 
content and prepared the list of 350 ‘vulnerable’ youths. According to B.S. Mohammed Yasin, 
a senior-rank police official and Head of State intelligence has said that  apart from the orthodox 
religious routine, the age (all of them are in twenties), and their high academic background 
(many are pursuing engineering and medicine) is a common factor among these 350 Indian 
youths.373 As a first step, the officials approached community elders and parents and organised 
the collective counselling sessions, handled by specially-trained officials of the National 
Investigation Agency (NIA) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB). According to the senior official, 
this campaign shows success in the first phase as many youths tend to believe that ‘the route 
was not easy as it was shown to them by their handlers’ and the campaign received complete 
support from the leaders of the community and parents.374 The support of community leaders 
and parents of the ‘vulnerable’ youths indicates their wish to actively participate in such 
campaigns that refreshes their mind and stop them to join the radical-extremist groups.  
 
Indian Foreign Fighters under Indian Jurisdiction 
 In context to the mobilisation of Indian nationals to travel to conflict zones, to join 
foreign terrorist, or other violent extremist organisations, the Government of India does not 
pass any specific rule of law. But as the notification on this matter, the Government of India 
recognises that the Islamic State is involved in radicalisation and recruitment of Indian youth, 
and their radicalisation is a matter of serious concern for the nation regarding its likely impact 
when such youth return to India.375 Apart from the Indian Penal Code of 1860, the only 
dominant regulation is the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act [UA(P)A] of 1967 that deals 
with terrorism-related matters. The UA(P) Act penalises the terrorist activities and related 
activities such as funding, membership, and support to the designated or banned terrorist 
organisations under the proscribed list in the ‘First Schedule’ of the said act. The list of banned 
                                                          
372 TNN, “Kerala: Operation Pigeon saves 350 youths from IS”, The Times of India, 30 June 2017, Available 
from: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kochi/kerala-operation-pigeon-saves-350-youths-from-
IS/articleshow/59376792.cms  
373 Ibid. 
374 Ibid. 
375 Ministry of Home Affairs, The Gazette of India: Extraordinary: Part II-Sec. 3(ii) (India: Regd. No. D.L.- 
33004/99, 2015), Available from: http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/NotiIS_260815.pdf  
 91 
 
organisations can be found at the website of Ministry of Home Affairs.376 To deal with the 
matters relating to proscribed organisations and contemporary situation of the Indian foreign 
fighters in IS, the collective sections of the Indian Penal Code 1860 and the Unlawful Activities 
Prevention Act 1967 are applicable. One of the two returnees, Areeb Majeed was arrested by 
the National Investigation Agency at Mumbai International Airport and in their ‘First 
Information Report’ (FIR), he was charged under Section 16 (committing a terrorist act), 
Section 18 (conspiracy of terrorist act- including organising training camps and recruitment) 
and Section 20 (membership of terrorist gang or organisation) of the Unlawful Activities 
Prevention Act 1967377 and Section 125 (waging war against any Asiatic Power in alliance 
with the Government of India) of the Indian Penal Code 1860.378  
 
Islamic State’s Dead Indian Foreign Fighters 
 According to the complied database by the author, out of 38 Indian foreign fighters 
travelled, 14 are reportedly dead while fighting for IS in Iraq and Syria. This sums to 36.84% 
of Indian foreign fighters killed in IS-controlled regions.  Unlike reported in Indian news-
media, the National Investigation Agency was not confirmed about some of the deaths, such 
as Mohammad ‘Bada’ Sajid379, Abdul Khadir Sultan Armar380, and Bestin Vincent aka  
Yahiya381, and enlisted them  as absconder in their ‘Most Wanted’ list,   with an assumption of 
their return to India in future. In 2016, a report by ICCT on ‘European foreign fighters’ tells 
that out of total 4,294 foreign fighters, 14% of foreign fighters are reported as ‘confirmed dead’ 
in conflict zones of Iraq and Syria.382 In comparison with EU data, the percentage of dead 
foreign fighters from India is almost double to percentage of ‘dead’ European foreign fighters. 
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In the same report, by 2015 ‘dead’ foreign fighters’ data from four EU nations—Belgium 
contributes the highest counts with 13.56% of 516 Belgian foreign fighters, followed by 
Germany- 13.15% of 760 German foreign fighters, United Kingdom- 9.21% of 760 British 
foreign fighters and France- 8.05% of 1700 French foreign fighters.383 Comparing with the data 
from these four European nations, India’s rate of dead foreign fighters is much higher, 36.84%.  
Recently, the Brookings Institute claimed in its article that 11 Indian foreign fighters have been 
confirmed killed: six in Syria, three in Afghanistan, one during an encounter in India, and 
remaining one in either Iraq or Syria.384 In late 2015, many Indian news-media reported the 
information about first six Indian foreign fighters of IS were  killed  in Iraq or Syria who were 
identified as— Athif Waseem Mohammed from Telangana, Mohammad Umar Subfan, Fair 
Masood, Abdul Kadir Sultan Armar from Karnataka, Saheem Farooque Tanki from 
Maharashtra and Mohammad ‘Bada’ Sajid from Uttar Pradesh.385 Apart from the news reports, 
there are no official confirmations from Indian authorities on the death of these Indian foreign 
fighters. Out of these six Indian fighters, Abdul Armar and Mohammad Sajid, were former 
members of IM. Both are enlisted as absconders  in the ‘most wanted’ list of India’s National 
Investigation Agency.386 Interestingly both, Armar and Sajid, are not charged to be a member 
of IS but for the series of bomb blasts in various cities of India which was  claimed by their 
group— Indian Mujahideen.387 After the arrests of many members and nearly dismantle of 
Indian Mujahideen group, Armar formed a separate group, Ansar-ul Tawhid Fi Bilad al-Hind 
(AuT) and showed greater potential in recruitment drive for IS. Abdul Armar’s passion towards 
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Islamic jihad impressed IS’s chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.  In a video posted by IS’s media 
branch al-Isabah, al-Baghdadi declared Sultan Armar as ‘Emir’ of AuT group.388 In March 
2015, various twitter accounts associated with IS payed homage to Sultan Armar whose alias 
name was ‘Abu Abdullah al-Hindi’, adding he had died fighting in the battle for Korbane in 
Syria; but the Indian authorities claimed that his death news is more-or-less confirmed.389  
 
The most common factors among the other four dead Indian foreign fighters, were having a 
financially well-off and good educational background. Athif Mohammad, Faiz Masood and 
Saheem Tanki, were acquired English-medium schools and colleges. Athif Mohammad 
graduated with a degree in Computer Science and pursued post-graduation in engineering at 
University of Greenwich, UK before travelling to Syria and joining IS. His closed relatives 
remembered Faiz Masood as a kind person who turned to a religious fanatic. The family 
members last heard from him on September 2013, before he left for a ‘business trip’ to Qatar. 
Indian authorities do not have any reports of his death, but it was reported in news media.390 
Reportedly, among these six dead Indian foreign fighters, Saheem Farooque Tanki was the 
only fighter to be die in a suicide mission in Syria. He was the part of first group of four Indian 
foreign fighters from Maharashtra that travelled to IS-controlled territory. Around mid-January 
2015, his image inscribing his last wish: “Tell my mother to come on correct creed so we can 
meet in Jannat”;391 was tweeted by IS supporters from Syria. 
 
Islamic State’s Indian Returnees 
A probability of a terrorist attack conducted by a returnee foreign fighter, cannot be 
ruled out. Foreign fighters may intend to fight in the conflict zones, but upon their return they 
pose a significant threat to the national security. According to a report, 30% of ‘returnees’ 
foreign fighters are from nine member States of European Union which accounts to 94% of 
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total population of foreign fighters from the European Union.392 Comparatively to the 
percentages of European Union’s four member states, the United Kingdom reaches on top with 
46%, followed by Germany with 33%, Belgium with 25% and France with 14.47% of returnee 
rates,393 whereas only 5% of Indian foreign fighters returned home and  sooner or later were 
apprehended by the Indian security agencies. In the compiled dataset of 38 Indian foreign 
fighters, only two individuals—Areeb Majeed and Subahani Haja Moideen, reportedly 
returned to India after spending few months in IS-controlled territory in Iraq and Syria.  
In comparison to the home-grown extremists, foreign fighters returned to their own countries 
are well-equipped with operational expertise, extensive weapon training and tactics. The 
returnees are more familiar with the target location and no previous criminal record or an 
affiliation with any extremist organisation expands their ability to dodge the law-enforcement 
agencies and this could be a reason behind fewer returnees were acknowledged. 
 
First Returnee— Areeb Ejaz Majeed 
Areeb Ejaz Majeed— a resident of Kalyan, district Thane of the Indian state of 
Maharashtra, is one of the two returnees ‘foreign fighter’ came back to India and got arrested 
by the Indian intelligence officials at the airport. With a background of an affluent family, 
Areeb is 22-years-old civil engineering diploma student and son of a Doctor father. According 
to Intelligence reports, he travelled to Iraq on a religious pilgrimage and then broke away from 
the group and further travelled to Mosul to join the IS. Being brainwashed with religious but 
radicalised thoughts, according to Areeb’s relatives he donated his ‘western’ clothes such as 
denims, avoided using his cell phone for a month and he tried to stop his sister, who is a doctor, 
to work and watch films. In his letter to family, before leaving for Iraq, he cursed his family 
members for ‘sinning’, living luxurious lives and not praying. He was motivated after watching 
the violent videos of Palestine-Israel conflicts. 
In late August 2014, he was reported dead and ‘glorified’ in a tweet from another jihad group, 
Ansar ul-Tawhid (AuT). This news was covered by various news media around the world.394 
                                                          
392 Berenice Boutin, Gregory Chauzal, Jessica Dorsey, Marjolein Jegerings, Christophe Paulussen, Johanna 
Pohl, Alastair Reed and Sofia Zavagli, “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union- Profiles, 
Threats & Policies”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism- The Hague, April 2016, Available from: 
https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-
April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf  
393 Ibid. 
394 Mail Today Bureau, “Mumbai Student who joined Islamic State killed in Syria”, Mail Online India, 28 
August 2014, Available from: www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2736191/Mumbai-student-
joined-Islamic-State-killed-Syria.html  
 95 
 
In late November, Areeb made a surprise return to India and got arrested. During interrogation 
with Indian Intelligence officials, he revealed that IS has lethal plans for India and he was 
disillusioned by menial work he was assigned in the conflict zone rather being allowed to join 
adventurous jihad he dreamt of. He also claimed that social media has played an important role 
in his radicalisation process. He was radicalised through Internet chat rooms and jihadi forums, 
particularly violent videos of Israel-Palestine conflict. As reported, he was injured by a bullet 
while working on a construction site for IS and recovered from injury in a week. IS gave him 
USD 2,000 and dropped him on Turkey border to go home. Areeb Majeed was charged under 
Section 125 (waging war against the state) of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 16 and 18 of 
the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) from the charges framed in the First 
Information Report filed by the NIA. However, Areeb’s lawyers filed an application for bail 
stating a reason that when Areeb Majeed travelled in 2014, IS was not a banned terrorist 
organisation in the India’s list of ‘Proscribed Terrorist Organisations’. However, NIA argued 
that at that point of time IS was banned by the United Nations Security Council in August 2014, 
which was binding on all member states, including India. In May 2017, Areeb Majeed’s bail 
application was rejected for third time by the Mumbai Civil and Session court.395 Earlier in 
February 2017, the special NIA court dropped charges under Section 20 of the Unlawful 
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 against Areeb Majeed claiming that the terror outfit IS was 
banned in February 2015 which was post to Areeb’s arrest in November 2014.396 Therefore, he 
shall not be charged for being a member of IS.  
 
Second Returnee— Subahani Haja Moideen aka Abu Meer 
On 05 October 2016, approximately after two years of the arrest of Areeb Majeed, 
India’s National Investigation Agency arrested Subahani Haja Moideen aka Abu Meer, a 
salesman at gold jewellery shop in District Tirunelveli in the state of Tamil Nadu. According 
to the reports, Moideen (31 years-old) claimed to his involvement in IS-Iraq, received training 
in Sharia law and combat for IS while he was in Mosul city of Iraq. He told the officials that 
on 08 April 2015, he left home to fight for IS and told his family that he is going to do Umrah 
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(pilgrimage).397 As guided by his handlers, after taking flight from Chennai (India), on visitor 
visa he travelled to Iraq via Istanbul (Turkey).  
 
Life in IS: An Experience of Subahani H. Moideen 
As told by Moideen to his interrogators, after reaching Istanbul, he crossed-over along 
with other individuals from Pakistan and Afghanistan to IS-occupied territory in Iraq where he 
was trained in the batch of 30-35 fighters and the training conditions were harsh where the 
trainees were kept in small room and received training from morning till evening. After the 
training, he was deployed to fight and get paid $100 (US Dollars) per month. After few days, 
when he could not tolerate the barbarism and misery conditions, Moideen decided to flee but 
got caught and ended up in ‘IS jail’. He conveyed his decision to quit and was imprisoned for 
forty days. During his imprisonment, he was subjected to extreme torture. According to a press 
release,398 along with other fighters he was produced before ‘IS judge’, following which he 
was again sent back to imprisonment at city of Raqqa in Syria. 
 
Subahani’s Escape Route to India 
 After 40 days of imprisonment, he was allowed to leave IS territory and returned to 
Turkey with five other foreign fighters. According to NIA’s press release, he crossed over to 
Turkey from where he communicated with his family through the Consulate General of India, 
Istanbul. With the assistance from the Consulate General of India, Istanbul, the Turkish police 
issued a clearance certificate following which he was issued an ‘Emergency Certificate’ by the 
Consulate General of India in Istanbul. Upon Moideen’s mysterious escape from Turkey, the 
author interview Shweta Desai who is a Delhi-based journalist and interviewed Moideen in a 
police custody after he was arrested. Shweta Desai told the author that Moideen made a false 
statement at the Consulate General of India in Istanbul that he travelled to Turkey on a tourist 
visa and had lost his Indian passport. Believing this fictional story, the Consulate General of 
India in Istanbul issued an ‘Emergency Certificate’ and scheduled his travel to India.399 On 22 
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September 2015, Moideen returned to Mumbai, Maharashtra and went to his ancestral place in 
Kadyanallur, Tirunelveli district in Tamil Nadu. He managed to get a job as a salesman in a 
Jewellery shop.400 Once he got settled, he again got in touch with the South Indian module of 
IS handlers over the Internet and was planning to collect explosives and chemicals. He also 
travelled to Chennai, Coimbatore and different places to meet other contacts in the alleged 
conspiracy with the guidance of his IS handlers in South India, as reported in the press release 
by the National Investigation Agency.401 On 05 October 2016, Moideen was arrested by the 
officials of NIA from Tirunelveli district of  Tamil Nadu and later produced in the special NIA 
court at Ernakulum, Tamil Nadu.402 No further information is available on public domain 
regarding his police or judicial custody.  
 
Conclusion 
 India—a secular-democratic country in Indian Subcontinent, is a home of 
approximately 170 million Muslims, which makes it the Second-largest Muslim population 
nation in the World. In context to India, the nature of terrorism has evolved with time and 
evolution of technology. The emergence of a radical extremist organisation-IS in the Middle-
Eastern region could only lure some counts of Indian Muslims to have joined as a foreign 
fighter. On a positive note, this could evident India’s strength of diversity and secular 
democracy. But most of these Indian foreign fighters were well-educated and employed, which 
does raise a question about their motivation behind travelling and joining the terror outfit. The 
mobilisation of these Indian youths highlights the vulnerability of self-radicalisation and 
successful recruitment over the Internet. With the evolution of technology, the tactics employed 
by the terrorist groups also change dramatically. The recruitment and radicalisation over the 
virtual network has become so easy that India has become one of the favourite recruitment beds 
for transnational groups such as al-Qaeda and IS, which seek the educated recruits to spread 
the agenda through social media. Countering terrorism is no longer limited to the geographical 
boundaries but expanded through-out to the cyberspace. The recent initiatives on de-
radicalisation process taken by two Indian states, Maharashtra Police and Kerala Police, are 
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first of its kind of steps to address the issue of radicalisation and Islamic extremism. The 
involvement of community leaders, parents, and youth will ease the process and highlight the 
gaps in communication and misunderstanding between the administration and community. 
Such programs shall be adopted at the large scale by every state in India to fill the vulnerability 
of radicalisation among Indian youth.  
 So far, India has not played an active role in US and allies-led war on IS but if India joins the 
global war against IS at larger stake then it might face the risk of becoming a target of attacks 
by IS inspired modules within India.  
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Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is in continuation of research on the Indian foreign fighters in the Islamic 
State. As summarised in the previous chapter and based on the dataset compiled by the author, 
total 38 Indian foreign fighters travelled to Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan to fight for IS. Out of 
these 14 foreign fighters are reportedly dead, two returned to India and were arrested by India’s 
counterterrorism agency. Those two returnees namely, Areeb Ejaz Majeed and Subahani Haja 
Moideen are going through judicial trials as per India’s anti-terrorism laws. Since 2016, the 
National Investigation Agency (NIA) that deals with the cases related to Islamic State in India, 
has arrested many people who were allegedly involved with IS activities in India. According 
to reports, most of these suspects are young, well-educated and computer savvy. Almost 80 
percent of these alleged IS sympathisers went to school.403 The emergence of IS sympathisers 
is a serious concern for the Indian law enforcement agencies, though none of these individuals 
have been successful in executing any act of terrorism on Indian soil. In the course, of this 
dissertation various assessments were carried out based on existing information. This chapter 
will arrive at certain conclusions ratified by existing data to analyse threat perception of IS in 
India. In this regard, it will consider two main categories of modus operandi to arrive at a 
concrete theory. These are as follows: (i) IS inspired ‘Lone-Wolf’ attacks in India, and (ii) the 
possibility of nexus between IS and other jihadi groups. 
 
How Serious is the Islamic State’s Threat to India? 
So far, India has not witnessed a terrorist attack which is directly inspired or conducted 
by IS. In 2016, IS released a 22-minute video showcasing the Indian foreign fighters flashing 
their guns and warning India to avenge the atrocities on Islam, referring to the events of 1992 
Babri Masjid (Babri Mosque) demolition and 2002 Gujarat Riots.404 This is the first-ever video 
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featuring Indian jihadists who mentioned their terror intentions against India and other South 
Asian countries. One of the jihadist in the video warns, “We will return, but with sword in 
hand, to slice your throats, to avenge the Babri Masjid (Babri Mosque), and killings of Muslims 
in Kashmir, in Gujarat, and in Muzaffarnagar.”405 According to a news report, among this 
group of jihadists, two jihadists, namely Mohammad Sajid and Abu Rashid, were ex-members 
of India’s home-grown terror outfit, Indian Mujahideen (IM) and fled to Pakistan during the 
breakdown of the outfit in 2008.406 In an interview published in the April 2016 issue of Dabiq—
the IS’s official magazine, Shaykh Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif stated that an establishment of strong 
jihadi base in Bengal will facilitate the guerrilla attacks inside India, which will assist the 
existing local Mujahideen groups.407 In March 2017, a press release from India’s Ministry of 
Home Affairs revealed that 75 individuals have been arrested so far, for their alleged links with 
IS.408 These arrested IS sympathisers are the result of recruitment and radicalisation through 
social media platforms, which is an internal threat for India to deal with. In December 2014, 
the arrest of Bangalore based IT savvy, Mehdi Masroor Biswas aka ‘Shami Witness’ 
(@shamiwitness) in Twitter world, revealed the presence of IS in Indian cyberspace. Mehdi 
Biswas was the most influential IS online sympathiser from India. He personally 
communicated with English-speaking members of IS and had interactions with one of the 
perpetrators of the July 2016 terrorist attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh.409 In March 2017, the Anti-
Terrorism Squad of Uttar Pradesh killed a terror suspect Saifullah who was believed to be the 
member of IS’s Khorasan module.410 
Until now, the clear threat to India was from the Pakistan-supported jihadist groups, which 
believed to have support from local jihadi modules based in India but since 2014, with the 
emergence of Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and IS’s vision of Khorasan region, 
there is a reasonable security threat which is lurking its wings to spread. When compared, the 
political and cultural attributes of India are different to those of Iraq and Syria. But in recent 
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years, the IS has managed to penetrate the mind of the Indian youth to some extent towards the 
phenomenon of jihadism. This resulted in the positive response of a few Indian Muslims to the 
call of IS and their subsequent travel to the conflict zone as foreign fighters. To the present 
date, the foreign fighters’ assessment report by the Soufan Group in 2015 which claimed 23 
Indian foreign fighters in IS,411 whereas according to a news report, more than  60 Indians have 
joined IS since 2014 and some of them have been killed in the conflict.412 The footprints of IS 
has been discovered in Southern states of India, mainly Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, 
Telangana where the IS sympathisers illustrated the presence of IS in India. This sums up to 
the theory that India could face a terrorist attack that might be directly or indirectly inspired 
and launched by IS, through either handful Indian foreign fighters upon their return or via local 
jihadi sleeper cells who sympathise with IS.  
 
Lone-Wolf Attacks: A Threat Posed by Returnees 
In early 2017, the downfall of IS, mainly its finances were dropped, media operations 
were no longer in motion and many of IS’s high-ranking fighters were either killed or 
captured.413 The biggest question in focus would be the future of its foreign fighters. What IS’s 
foreign fighters will do next? Would they travel to different countries and may join other 
ongoing conflicts, or would they return to their respective countries or would they remain in 
the conflict zones of Iraq or Syria likewise few Arab fighters who stayed in Afghanistan post-
Afghan-Soviet war? In general, the returnees may pose a serious threat as they are privileged 
with extensive combat training and tactics. Also, with no previous criminal backgrounds, 
returnees could easily skip the observance of law-enforcement agencies. The top four European 
nations contribute to the higher rate of returnee foreign fighters, the United Kingdom has 46%, 
Germany has 33%, Belgium has 25% and France has 14% returnees,414 whereas with only two 
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returnees out of 38 Indian foreign fighters, India stands with only 5% in the table. Considering 
the total count of Indian foreign fighters and vigilance of Indian law-enforcement agencies, the 
chances of threat posed by the Indian foreign fighters upon their return to India are few and far 
between. If returnees are not a serious concern, then we may look at the other probabilities 
through which IS may inspire terrorist attacks on Indian soil. 
 
To What Extent India is Vulnerable to Lone-Wolves? 
 The phenomenon of lone-wolf attackers is not new. Referring to the era of Colonial 
India, the phenomenon of lone-wolf attacks is not new. Dated back to 1920s, on 23 December 
1926, Qazi Abdur Rasheed assassinated a Hindu named Swami Shraddhanand, also known as 
Munshi Ram. Swami Shraddhanand was a former British-India police employee who quit his 
job for a saintly life. Swami Shraddhanand was involved in publishing literature against Islam 
and the founder of Islam. As another example of lone-wolf, a similar attack of the France’s 
‘Charlie Hebdo’ took place in April 1929 in the city of Lahore (now in Pakistan), when one of 
the publishers based in Lahore, Rajpal Publisher, was undeterred and published another book 
against Islam, it was named ‘Rangeela Rasool’ (The ‘Colourful’ Prophet) in Hindi language.415 
This book was a mockery on the life of the Prophet Mohammad that led to strong protest from 
the Muslim community in British-India.416 On 19 April 1929, Ilmuddin, an ordinary youth and 
much like a lone-wolf attacker of present time, entered the office of ‘Rajpal Publishers’ and 
stabbed Rajpal with his dagger. Rajpal died on the spot and Ilmuddin was sentenced to death 
and hanged; later hundreds of thousands of Muslims attended his Ilmuddin’s funeral.417 
 Considering the recent events of lone-wolf attacks, Gabriel Weimann defined Lone-Wolf 
terrorists as individuals or a small group of individuals, who are not members of any terrorist 
organisation. They act without any cooperation with cell or group, targeting the civilians—to 
achieve explicitly political or ideological goals.418 It is a fastest-growing form of terrorism, 
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where individuals involved were radicalised, recruited, trained on social media platforms.419 
The series of lone-wolf attacks sets another example of a threat which grows internally in a 
nation. The 2014 Sydney hostage crisis or the Boston bombings, multiple incidents of stabbing 
in London and the vehicle rampage killing dozens on the busy street of Barcelona, Spain are 
among the prominent incidents of lone-wolf attacks. The past records of lone-wolf attackers 
revealed that such attackers are either faced psychological problems or acted under the 
influence of closed sects.420 To reach the expansion of their extremism propaganda, Al-Qaeda 
and IS trying all possible ways to outreach and lure Indian Muslim men towards jihadi 
extremism via social media access. In 2016, IS released a propaganda video in which few 
Indians waving Kalashnikovs and urged Indian Muslims to “leave their country and join the 
jihad in Syria against the Kuffars (infidels)”.421  
 
Islamic State + Other Jihadi Groups: A Fatal Axis  
Diversity in culture and religions in India binds together the citizens of this nation in 
one thread of unity. Regardless of this strength, India meets the challenges posed by the 
domestic and cross-border terrorist groups since five decades. Time-to-time, the security of 
India is threatened by the various home-grown such as Naxalites, Maoists, Sikh militant groups 
and Islamic militant groups, mainly operated in the Indian state of Kashmir which is supported 
by other jihadi groups based in Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (PoK) region. Cross-border 
terrorist groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HM) and Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT) have been main perpetrators behind most of the terrorist attacks on Indian soils. 
Many times, these terrorist attacks were carried out with the support of India’s indigenous 
terrorist organisation, Indian Mujahideen or IM. Reportedly, Indian Mujahideen had strong 
affiliations with Pakistan’s ISI supported cross-border terror groups, including LeT and Harkat-
ul Jihad Islami (HuJI).422 Likewise most of the anti-India Islamic terrorist groups, the motive 
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of IM was to carry-out terrorist attacks on Indian soil and actions against non-Muslims in 
furtherance to the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate in India and across South-Asia.423 
One of the objectives of Islamic State is to establish the Caliphate in the Indian Subcontinent 
through its regional branch- IS-Khorasan, for which the possibility of a nexus between IS and 
other active jihadi extremist groups  is rare but cannot be ruled out. As the IS’s access to India 
is limited due to natural topography, it may intend to use the logistics and manpower of other 
jihadi groups active in Pakistan and Bangladesh. As the cross-border jihadi groups which are 
based in PoK, are pre-occupied in the conflict of Kashmir, therefore to lure the Indian Muslims 
towards so-called Jihad, Islamic State is using various means of social-media. Influenced with 
their ideology, the first indication of IS’s presence in India appeared in May 2014 when four 
Indian youth travelled to Syria to fight for IS. Since then, the Indian law-enforcement agencies 
unveiled several modules within India that supports the ideology and sympathises with IS. 
According to a report, in 2016 NIA arrested 112 suspects, out of which 64 arrests were related 
to jihadi terror network. In 12 cases related to IS, 52 individuals were arrested and 35 were 
reported abscond.424 The data highlights a low but a significant spread of IS’s ideology. 
As mentioned earlier, cross-border terror groups have been the main culprits behind Islamic 
terrorism on Indian soil. Routine attempts of infiltrations by cross-border militants are 
contained by the Indian armed forces personnel. Notably, Pakistan’s ISI  which provides the 
logistic and financial support to these terror groups mainly, LeT.425 In pursuit of Kashmir, these 
cross-border terror groups are nothing but an essential components of Pakistan’s foreign policy 
against India.426 In mid-2017, The United States’ Director of National Intelligence Daniel 
Coats, stated that Pakistan has failed to curb the militant and terrorist groups active in Pakistan 
and “these groups will present a sustained threat to the US’ interest in the region and continue 
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to plan and conduct terrorist attacks in India and Afghanistan”.427 During a Senate Armed 
Services Committee in early-October of 2017, US Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford said 
that he believed Pakistan’s ISI Directorate has connections with terrorist groups.428 Responding 
to the links between ISI and militant groups, Pakistan Army’s Director General of the Inter-
Services Public Relations (ISPR), Major General Asif Ghafoor said that there is a difference 
between having links and supporting the militant groups. Every intelligence agency has links 
which could be positive.429 Clarifying the stand of Pakistan’s link with Haqqani Network and 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif remarked that terror 
networks such as Haqqani Network, Hafeez Saeed’s Jamaat-ud Dawa, and LeT were 
favourites of US around 20 years to 30 years back; “they were being dined and wined in the 
White House and now US say, go to hell Pakistanis because you are nurturing these people.”430 
Such blame-game between two states will surely open up doors of opportunities to a third non-
state actors such as IS. LeT is one of the most active jihadi group that follows Wahhabi ideology 
and financially backed by Saudi money and sheltered by Pakistan’s ISI.431 So far, LeT’s 
operations are limited against India and ‘false’ theory of India’s occupancy on Kashmir. Al-
Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) which is a faction of jihadist groups, aims to fight against 
the governments of South Asian countries and establishing an Islamic State (not to confuse 
with IS). AQIS and LeT might have common target- India, but no affiliation has emerged 
between these two groups. Whereas, LeT and IS follows common ideology of Ahle-Hadith or 
Salafism but differ in their goals, as former aiming on the issue of Kashmir and latter focuses 
on the establishment of Islamic State in Indian Subcontinent. However, with lack of evidences 
to prove but on the basis of assumption, the possibility of merger between these two Islamist 
extremist groups is not on surface so far.   
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Conclusion 
 In 2014, the emergence of AQIS and announcement of IS’s vision to expand its Wilayat 
(territory) covering the Indian Subcontinent by 2020— highlights the ideological rivalry and 
race of recruiting jihadis to propagate their respective goals. The appointment of Asim Umar, 
an Indian born in the State of Uttar Pradesh, as an Emir of AQIS shows the group’s vision to 
lure Indian Muslim men to join-in. In 2014, the mobilisation of four Indian Muslim youth from 
the state of Maharashtra, raised the concern and emergence of IS’s ideology among Indian 
Muslim. The video interview posted by the media-wing of IS showed Indian mujahids (mostly 
ex-members of indigenous IM) waving-off AK-47 and warning Indian government and Hindus 
to avenge the Indian government and Hindus for the atrocities on the Muslim community in 
India. The mobilisation of Indian Muslim men and few women evident the penetration of IS 
among Indian Muslim youth, but at very low level if compared with other South Asian nations, 
where foreign fighter counts are higher.  
Since the cross-border jihadi groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) 
and Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HM), are protected and financed by Pakistan’s ISI with the primary 
motive of jihad against India, the affiliation of these groups with Islamic State is a rare 
possibility. If such affiliation emerged, these groups will lose the shelter given by Pakistan’s 
ISI and further in that situation, these groups might face Pakistan’s military aggression as a 
part of ‘War on Terror’. On the other side, though IS born-out as a faction of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
but it differs in the strategic and operational view-point. Where, Al-Qaeda believes in 
developing a global terror network via allotting its ‘franchisee’ to various low-level jihadi 
groups, IS seeks in controlling and administering its own occupied territory, with a vision of 
territorial expansion. Therefore, taking these assumptions in account, the merger between IS 
and al-Qaeda or IS and other jihadi groups seems a ‘fictional story’ till date, but invites a 
prospect for further research on the same. 
